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ABSTRACT 
The practice of patenting genetic material is currently under sharp attack. 
Recent litigation has forced the courts to grapple with the doctrinal basis for 
patenting DNA sequences identical to those found in nature. Faced with 
conflicting authorities and difficult policy questions, courts have leaned heavily 
on history to guide—or at least to justify—their decisions. 
This article explores the history in question. It traces the patent law’s 
changing treatment of “products of nature” in an attempt to untangle the origins 
of present-day patentability arguments. The evidence suggests that the historical 
foundations of the bar on patenting products of nature are surprisingly shaky. 
The article also reveals how isolated biological materials first came to be 
patented. This task, I argue, requires looking not only to court decisions, but also 
to the history of patent practice. My principal vehicle for doing so is the case of 
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., a century-old decision by Judge 
Learned Hand, which now stands as a central (and much disputed) precedent for 
the patenting of DNA sequences. Parke-Davis arose at a key moment in the 
sociology of intellectual property, when the American pharmaceutical industry 
first learned to embrace the power of patents. The article shows how Parke-Davis 
came to prominence in half-understood form during the biotechnology era, and 
how the decision’s original rationale suddenly seems poised to play a major role 
in resolving the gene patent question. 
 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author is grateful for the thoughts 
of Derek Bambauer, Frederic Bloom, Anisha Dasgupta, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Robin Effron, 
Daniel Hulsebosch, Osagie Imasogie, Daniel Kevles, Brian Lee, Irina Manta, Michael Risch, 
Joshua Sarnoff, Katherine Strandburg, Kara Swanson, Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, and 
participants in the NYU Law School Innovation Policy Colloquium and in junior-faculty 
workshops at Fordham and Brooklyn Law Schools. A Brooklyn Law School Dean’s 
Summer Research Stipend supported research for the project. 
258 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:229 
 
INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................... 258 
I. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY .................... 264 
A. Patent Law 101........................................................................................... 264 
B. Problems of Nature .................................................................................... 266 
II. SEARCHING FOR THE ORIGINS OF THE PRODUCT-OF-NATURE DOCTRINE ......... 268 
A. The Unpatentability of Natural Laws and Principles ................................. 268 
B. The Murky Origins of the Product-of-Nature Doctrine .............................. 271 
C. The Advent of “Useful Difference” ............................................................ 276 
III. SCIENTIFIC INDUSTRY, PATENT CULTURES, AND PATENT LAW IN THE 
EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY .......................................................................... 280 
A. American Pharmaceuticals and Patent Skepticism .................................... 280 
B. Synthetic Drugs and the German Invasion ................................................. 282 
IV. THE ADRENALIN PATENT ................................................................................. 284 
A. Patenting Adrenalin ................................................................................... 285 
B. Adrenalin on Trial ...................................................................................... 289 
C. Was Parke-Davis Rightly Decided? ............................................................ 293 
V. THE PRACTICE AND LAW OF PATENTING NATURE AFTER PARKE-DAVIS ........... 296 
A. Practice ...................................................................................................... 296 
B. Law ............................................................................................................. 299 
C. A New View of Parke-Davis at the Federal Circuit? .................................. 306 
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 310 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, it is possible in the United States to patent the genetic material of a 
living organism, as long as it is isolated from the host animal, plant, virus, or 
bacterium. This information sometimes startles lay audiences. Surely, they ask, 
patent law protects only new inventions? How can a DNA sequence already 
present in an organism—present, perhaps, in me—be the subject of a new or 
future patent? 
It’s not a bad question. After all, the Patent Act requires “novelty,”1 a 
criterion that one might expect to exclude (for example) genes carried by 
generations of our own ancestors. In addition, the subject-matter provisions of 
the Act have been described as covering inventions “made by man.”2 DNA 
sequences identical to those found in nature, whether isolated or not, might 
seem to stretch the definition of what is human-made. At the same time, a long 
 
 1.  35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 2.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (contemplating protection for 
“anything under the sun that is made by man”) (quoting S. REP. No 1979, 82d Cong., 2d 
Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6 (1952)). The phrase appears in 
the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act. In its full context this quotation is far less 
permissive than usually supposed: “A person may have ‘invented’ a machine or a 
manufacture, which may include anything under the sun made by man, but it is not 
necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled.” H.R. 
REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6 (1952). 
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line of cases rejects patents for “natural” artifacts. Courts and the Patent Office 
have invalidated claims for extracted plant material,3 for purified forms of 
naturally-occurring metals,4 and for new combinations of bacteria,5 to name 
some of the leading examples. Though based on a clutch of different rationales, 
these decisions are thought to form a loosely aggregated “product-of-nature” 
doctrine excluding naturally occurring articles from patentability.6 
Fortunately for would-be gene patentees, the product-of-nature prohibition 
comes with a significant loophole. Products that have been isolated from their 
natural state and rendered free from associated materials have been recognized 
as patentable in an almost equally long line of cases. Such products, the theory 
goes, do not exist in their isolated form in nature, and have properties not found 
in the natural form of the material.7 This logic has enabled patent law to 
embrace biological products ranging from hormones and vitamins in the early 
twentieth century to DNA sequences in the early twenty-first. Thousands of 
gene patents have issued under the isolated-and-purified rubric in the past 
twenty years.8 
Now, however, the patentable status of isolated DNA sequences hangs in 
the balance. The U.S. Supreme Court is currently considering Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, a challenge to the validity of two 
patents relating to two human genes. The Myriad case has thus far been a 
succession of unexpected developments. First, Judge Sweet of the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York jolted the biotechnology world by 
 
 3.  Ex parte Latimer, 1889 DEC. COMM’R PAT. 123. 
 4.  Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642 (3d Cir. 1928); In re 
Marden, 47 F.2d 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931); In re Marden, 47 F.2d 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931). 
 5.  Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 6.  See, e.g., 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02(7), at 7-20 (2003). 
 7.  U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 
1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) (“An isolated and purified DNA molecule that has the same 
sequence as a naturally occurring gene is eligible for a patent because (1) an excised gene is 
eligible for a patent as a composition of matter or as an article of manufacture because that 
DNA molecule does not occur in that isolated form in nature, or (2) synthetic DNA 
preparations are eligible for patents because their purified state is different from the naturally 
occurring compound.”). 
 8.  See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 
F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Ass’n for Molecular Pathology I] (citations omitted) 
(“It is estimated that the PTO has issued 2,645 patents claiming ‘isolated DNA’ over the past 
twenty-nine years, and that by 2005, had granted 40,000 DNA-related patents covering, in 
non-native form, twenty percent of the genes in the human genome”). The source for most 
such estimates is a now-dated quantitative study of gene patents. Kyle Jensen & Fiona 
Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310 SCIENCE 239, 239 
(2005). The notion that patents “cover” twenty percent of the human genome is disputed. See 
Christopher M. Holman, Will Gene Patents Impede Whole Genome Sequencing? 
Deconstructing the Myth that Twenty Percent of the Human Genome is Patented, 2 IP 
THEORY 1 (2011). 
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holding the claims invalid.9 Then, a further shock: the United States 
government entered the fray as amicus curiae on appeal to argue that isolated 
genomic DNA is not patentable after all.10 Myriad thus became a contest of 
usually-irresistible forces in patent law: on one side the weight of the federal 
government’s position11 and on the other the settled expectations of the 
inventing community and the enormous vested interests of the patent-holding 
biotechnology sector. 
Perhaps reflecting these contrary pressures, the Federal Circuit produced a 
split decision: a 2-1 vote to uphold the claims relating to isolated DNA 
sequences, but with all three judges on the panel advancing different standards 
for patentability.12 Amid these splintered opinions, the doctrine permitting 
isolated gene patents arrives at the Supreme Court in disarray, and with its 
future in doubt. 
Whatever the outcome, it is clear that a substantial part of the ongoing legal 
battle will be waged over the history of patent law and practice. Arguments at 
trial in Myriad suggested as much, with the patentees laying claim to “almost 
100 years of jurisprudence” supporting patentability13 and plaintiffs citing 
“long-established Supreme Court precedent,” going back to the nineteenth 
century, to the contrary.14 
 
 9.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 
2d 181, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 10.  Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (No. 2010-1406); Alison Frankel, Amicus Shocker: DOJ Opposes PTO Policy, Says 
Genes Not Patentable, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Nov. 4, 2010. 
 11.  The U.S. government’s advocacy typically exerts remarkable influence on courts’ 
patent policy decisions. See Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ 
Friends Can Teach Us About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 397 (2011) (noting 
that between 1989 and 2009 every single amicus brief authored by the United States in a 
Supreme Court patent case, with one exception, predicted the case outcome); John F. Duffy, 
The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518 
(2010).. Unusually in Myriad, the government’s litigating position diverged from the 
apparent preferences of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. PTO attorneys pointedly did 
not appear on the United States’ amicus brief. 
 12. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology I, cert. granted and decision vacated, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), remanded as Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) [hereinafter Ass’n for Molecular Pathology II]. 
 13.  Myriad Defendants’ Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Myriad 
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 23, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515), 2010 
WL 1048411 [hereinafter “Defendants’ January 29 Memorandum”]. See also Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology II, 689 F. 3d. at 1347 (Moore, J., concurring) (“There is a century-long 
history of affirming patent protection for isolated and purified biological products ranging 
from hormones to vitamins to proteins to antibiotics.”). 
 14.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 
19, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 
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The historical range of this dispute is not merely ornamental, but a typical 
feature of high-level patent contests more generally. Patent jurisprudence has 
emerged over time as a field with strong judge-made elements, drawing the 
courts back again and again to nineteenth-century authorities.15 Among patent 
doctrines, the question of patentable subject matter is perhaps the area of the 
law most shaped by non-statutory common-law edicts.16 And within this area, 
both the product-of-nature rule and its isolation-and-purification exception have 
the distinction of being well-established traditions with relatively vague legal 
foundations. 
This historical indeterminacy is a potential problem. Given the scale of the 
interests at stake, policy considerations of some kind will likely drive the 
outcome of the gene-patent litigation. But the historical cases will almost 
certainly be used to supply an account of why the chosen result is conceptually 
coherent and continuous with earlier practice. If the reasoning of those opinions 
is twisted or truncated in the process, then the result will be less clarity rather 
than more. The article that follows thus aims to untangle the history at issue. 
My vehicle for doing so is one of the foundational cases in the gene 
patenting debate: Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co.17 In this case, 
decided in 1911, the celebrated judge Learned Hand upheld a patent for 
isolated adrenalin derived from animal glands. For the defenders of gene 
patents, Learned Hand’s decision represents the foundation of the isolation-
and-purification exception, and thus the beginning of the long judicial tradition 
underpinning modern patents for isolated genetic material. For opponents, 
Hand’s opinion represents an erroneous—and fateful—divergence from the 
true bar on patenting products of nature. Whatever one’s position, Parke-Davis 
v. Mulford “is now a standard citation for the theory permitting patents on DNA 
sequences,”18 having been cited in more than two hundred law review and 
 
(S.D.N.Y 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515), 2009 WL 3269113 [hereinafter “Plaintiffs’ 
Memorandum”]. 
 15.  Among recent Supreme Court cases see: Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 
(2010) (citing Le Roy v. Tatham¸ 55 U.S. 156 (1852)); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec., 
Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 618 (citing Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852)); KSR Int’l Co. 
v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 405 (2007) (citing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 
(1850)); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 723 (2002) 
(citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853)). 
 16.  For example, the definition of patentable subject matter in § 101 of the Patent Act 
says nothing about the “well established” exceptions for “laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226; 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). See also 
John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 609 (2009). On patent law as a “hybrid” field combining statutory and common-law 
requirements, with the Patent Act as a “common law enabling statute,” see, e.g.: Craig A. 
Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 53 (2010); 
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 
23 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 787, 803 (2008). 
 17.  Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). 
 18.  ROBERT MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 112 (4th 
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periodical articles in the last twenty years.19 
The history of Parke-Davis is, in many ways, the key to the history of the 
product-of-nature question. Four perspectives on the case illuminate the 
broader issue. First, Parke-Davis exemplifies a central historical challenge for 
thinking about patentable subject matter: the problem of translating the older 
case law (which the courts insist still applies) into the modern doctrinal 
framework.20 The current notion of a stand-alone patentable subject matter 
requirement does not map well onto the older cases, which intertwined issues 
of novelty, utility, and inventiveness—all now treated as separate conditions of 
patentability. Much of the current struggle to define the subject matter 
requirement turns on whether it should be allowed to incorporate (explicitly or 
implicitly) aspects of patent law’s other policies. Parke-Davis, as a crucial 
instance of the older form of blended reasoning, exposes that dilemma for 
modern interpreters of the law. 
Second, Parke-Davis lays bare the development of the product-of-nature 
doctrine and its exception for isolated materials. In particular, the case reveals 
what the law of natural-product patents was—or wasn’t—following its 
supposedly formative period in the late nineteenth century. Contrary to 
common assumption, the prohibition on patenting “natural” items as such was 
not clearly established at the time. Both the Parke-Davis litigation and the 
history of the adrenalin patent at the Patent Office show the lack of a clear line 
between natural and non-natural artifacts in patent law, undercutting any easy 
assumption about the immemorial origins of that distinction.21 
Third, Parke-Davis reveals a story about the actual practices of patenting. 
This history itself has a kind of legal authority. Because patentable subject 
matter is traditionally a judge-made, common-law area, the courts consistently 
look to the history of patentee behavior for guidance about what the law was.22 
The adrenalin case shows a much more mixed picture than decisional law alone 
would suggest. Before Parke-Davis, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, at least some patents issued for materials merely extracted from 
natural sources. After Parke-Davis, the practice escalated. Victory for the 
adrenalin patent provided the template for hormone patenting, a watershed in 
both biomedical research and in patent practice. Parke-Davis thus became the 
gateway to patenting isolated biological substances in the twentieth century—
 
ed. 2007). 
 19.  See Westlaw database search, KeyCite citing references to Parke-Davis, from 
1911 to Feb. 15, 2013. 
 20.  See infra Part II.A. 
 21.  See infra Parts III.A, B. 
 22.  This is what happened, for example, in the recent case of Bilski v. Kappos, where 
much ink was spilled over the question of whether business-method or business-method-like 
patents had historically been issued in Britain and the United States. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239-
50 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). See also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966-76 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (Dyk, J., concurring); id. at 986-94 (Newman, J., concurring). 
Winter 2013] PATENTING NATURE 263 
despite a turn against product-of-nature patents in the courts just a few years 
later.23 
Finally, the decision has had a strange and instructive career as precedent. 
Learned Hand’s opinion largely lay dormant in the first half of the twentieth 
century, when the courts adopted a broadly skeptical line against patents and 
the boundaries of patentability. In the second half of the century, however, it re-
emerged as persuasive authority on patentable subject matter, and in the last 
few decades it has taken on the status of a leading case. Most recently, Parke-
Davis has moved to the center of the gene patent litigation—although not so 
much in letter as in spirit.24 
For all these reasons, Parke-Davis is a suitable lens through which to view 
the historical development of product-of-nature patenting. One strand of this 
article will trace the patent law’s changing treatment of products of nature, 
beginning with several problematic nineteenth-century precursors, picking up 
with Judge Hand’s decision and its place in the genesis of natural-product 
patenting, and continuing through its doctrinal legacy in the twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries. The other strand of the article follows a different, but 
related theme: an investigation of the cultures and practices of intellectual 
property. In the context of product-of-nature patenting, such an exercise takes 
us back into an unfamiliar world. The crucial steps towards patenting isolated 
biological material took place at a time when patenting in the life sciences 
looked very different, and the U.S. pharmaceutical industry was positively 
reluctant to employ product patents as a business tool. That changed, and 
changed rapidly, right around the time of the adrenalin case. The story of 
Parke-Davis is a window into the process of change. 
The approach of the article is thus a mixture of intellectual genealogy and 
contextual history. Part II briefly lays out the historical challenges plaguing the 
gene-patent question and the law of patentable subject matter generally. Part III 
seeks out the origins of the prohibition on patenting products of nature, finding 
them less secure than one might think. Parts IV and V home in on the early 
twentieth century, when the foundations for later law and practice began to be 
laid: first reconstructing the legal, scientific, and commercial setting of 
biomedical patenting, and then using the adrenalin case to rethink the state of 
the law at that time. Part V steps back to follow transformations in patent 
practice and patent law after Parke-Davis. The article concludes by returning to 
the Myriad case, and offering some observations on the implications of this 
history for the gene patenting debate. 
 
 23.  See infra Parts VI.A, B. 
 24.  See infra Part VI.B. 
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I. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY 
The current state of patentable subject matter doctrine is messy, to say the 
least. A “swamp of verbiage . . . [a] murky morass,”25 and “the ‘substantive 
due process’ of patent law”26 are some of the epithets recently applied to the 
topic. Some of the confusion arises from the role played by history in this area 
of the law. 
A. Patent Law 101 
Section 101 of the patent statute makes eligible for patenting “any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”27 This 
wording has been constant since the 1793 Patent Act, except in replacing the 
archaic term “art” with its modern equivalent, “process.”28 No explicit subject 
matter exclusions are listed. The law of unpatentable subject matter—the 
universally-acknowledged prohibition on patents for “laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas”29—thus arises entirely from judicial 
pronouncements. 
This fact creates some knotty problems when it comes to interpreting 
precedent. The current statutory scheme, laid out in 1952, divides the 
requirements of patentability neatly into separate conditions: patent-eligible 
subject matter (found in 35 U.S.C. §101); utility (§101); novelty (§102); 
nonobviousness (§103); and sufficiency of disclosure (§112). In pre-1952 
cases, however, these prerequisites tangled, merged, and overlapped with each 
other. A court could invalidate a claim based on a newly discovered natural 
principle on the grounds that the patent lacked sufficient “invention” (or what 
we would today call nonobviousness).30 Elsewhere, judges could find a product 
sufficiently novel for patenting because it possessed a powerful new utility.31 
Absent a requirement to separate considerations of novelty, eligibility, utility, 
and inventive creativity, courts generally did not do so. Because many of the 
leading cases on patentable subject matter are blended decisions of this kind, it 
 
 25.  MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 26.  Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (Rader, J., concurring). 
 27.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 28.  Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318-23. The 1793 Act replaced the first U.S. Patent Act 
of 1790, which allowed patents for “any art, manufacture, engine, machine or device.” Patent 
Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109-12. “Process” entered the statute in 1952. See Act of July 19, 1952, 
ch. 950, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, § 101. 
 29.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
 30.  Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131-32 (1948). 
 31.  See, e.g., Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co. v. Kuehmsted, 171 F. 887, 890 
(C.C.N.D. Ill. 1909); see also the discussion in Part III.C infra. 
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can be hard to discern the true contours of the doctrine. 
There are a couple of possible approaches to this situation. One is to 
suggest that, as a historical matter, there is really no such thing as a doctrine of 
unpatentable subject matter. In this view, all of the canonical cases can be 
explained in terms of other patentability requirements: lack of novelty, 
invention, adequate disclosure, and so on.32 This argument has much to 
recommend it, not least a sense of blessed relief: if we were to write the non-
statutory exclusions out of the patent law, and apply other criteria with 
sufficient rigor, we could potentially leave unpatentable the things that are 
currently thought unpatentable while freeing ourselves of the “confused and 
inconsistent jurisprudence of patentable subject matter.”33 
That is not going to happen, however. In its most recent statement on the 
subject, the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he relevant cases rest their 
holdings upon section 101, not later sections,” and that “to shift the patent-
eligibility inquiry entirely to these later sections risks creating significantly 
greater legal uncertainty, while assuming that those sections can do work that 
they are not equipped to do.”34 The Court refuses to “make the ‘law of nature’ 
exception to § 101 patentability a dead letter,” as such an approach “is . . . not 
consistent with prior law.”35 
The Court’s commitment to a stand-alone subject matter requirement as a 
matter of “prior law” creates follow-on historical challenges. Patentees and the 
lower courts must parse the mixed reasoning of the older cases in order to 
divine the scope of the § 101 exclusions. One strand of patent law, long curated 
by the late Judge Giles Rich (a drafter of the 1952 Act), has insisted on a strict 
separation between the functions and content of novelty, nonobviousness, 
utility, and patent-eligible subject matter.36 This rigid separation has proved 
difficult to maintain in the face of either the case law or the particular 
challenges of the § 101 cases.37 The alternative is to accept that patentable 
subject matter is a traditionally blended inquiry, and not to shy away from 
 
 32.  Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591 (2008). 
 33.  Id. at 591. 
 34.  Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303-04 
(2012). 
 35.  Id. at 1303. 
 36.  See, e.g., In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960-64 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“Achieving the 
ultimate goal of a patent under those statutory provisions involves, to use an analogy, having 
the separate keys to open in succession the three doors of sections 101, 102, and 103”); see 
also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189-90 (1981) (citation omitted) (noting that while it 
had been argued that “novelty is an appropriate consideration under § 101,” “[t]he 
question . . . of whether a particular invention is novel is ‘wholly apart from whether the 
invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter’”). 
 37.  See, e.g., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 (“We recognize that, in evaluating the 
significance of additional steps, the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 
novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap”); see also Duffy, supra note 16 (detailing the 
struggles of patent-eligibility provisions based on rules rather than flexible standards). 
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incorporating concepts of novelty, utility, and inventiveness into it. As I will 
suggest in this article, considering the historical case law in its own terms 
nudges us in that direction. 
B. Problems of Nature 
As the courts edge towards a resolution of the § 101 product-of-nature 
question, both the parties and the bench have proven unable to escape the 
gravitational pull of the older case law. The district court in Myriad noted 
Judge Rich’s admonition that “statements in the older cases must be handled 
with care lest the terms used in their reasoning clash with the reformed 
terminology of the present statute.”38 Even so, nobody involved has shown an 
inclination to limit the terms of argument to post-1952 concepts. Several 
questions result. 
One is where the prohibition on patenting products of nature comes from. 
For opponents of the isolated DNA patents, the answer lies in a “clear line of 
Supreme Court precedent and accompanying lower court authorities, stretching 
from American Wood-Paper [in 1879] through to Chakrabarty [in 1980].”39 
Briefly, the canon of precedent deployed against patentability runs like this: a 
pair of Supreme Court cases from the late nineteenth century purportedly 
dealing with purification of natural materials; a decision by the Commissioner 
of Patents in 1889, Ex parte Latimer, rejecting a patent for extracted plant fiber; 
a clutch of cases from the 1920s and 1930s rejecting patents for pure metals; 
and three further Supreme Court decisions: American Fruit Growers v. 
Brogdex (1931), rejecting a patent for fruit treated with mold-resistant coating, 
Funk Brothers v. Kalo Inoculant Co. (1948), invalidating a patent for a 
combination of natural bacteria, and Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980), 
approving a patent for a man-made bacterium. Later sections of this article will 
consider the provenance and solidity of this canon. It is fair to say that the 
oldest cases, at least, provide a shaky foundation for the “product of nature” 
doctrine. 
A converse question is where the exception for isolated natural materials 
comes from. Perhaps the central fact-on-the-ground of the Myriad litigation is 
that patents have been issued—in large numbers—on isolated DNA and on 
other isolated natural substances: indeed, for one member of the Myriad 
Federal Circuit panel, the “settled expectations of the inventing community” 
based on “arguably a century or more” of PTO policy were a decisive factor in 
upholding isolated-DNA patents.40 So: is this history of practice correct? And 
how did it begin? At trial, the patent holder, Myriad Genetics, answered with a 
 
 38.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 220 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 
F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979)). 
 39.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 227. 
 40.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology II at 16-17. 
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venerable authority: Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co.41 Starting with 
this “seminal” decision, a “long and unbroken line of authority” stretched 
across “100 years of jurisprudence” to the present day, affirming patentability 
of isolated natural materials that met the criteria of being new and useful.42 
When asserting the consistency of Parke-Davis with subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions, Myriad made sure to underline the expertise of its author, 
Judge Learned Hand. Hand, in the words of Judge Rich no less, “knew as much 
patent law as any judge ever has.”43 
All these arguments might once have qualified as conventional wisdom in 
the patent community, but none of them found favor with the court. Judge 
Sweet declined to read Parke-Davis as a patentable subject matter decision, 
viewing it as a case that turned on novelty.44 In any case, the judge declared, 
the whole isolation-and-purification line that allegedly descended from Parke-
Davis was suspect: “[m]any . . . including scientists in the fields of molecular 
biology and genomics, have considered this practice a ‘lawyer’s trick’ that 
circumvents the prohibitions on the direct patenting of the DNA in our bodies 
but which, in practice, reaches the same result.”45 In both the view of Myriad 
and that of its critics, Parke-Davis thus has the distinction of emerging as a 
foundational moment—though whether as an original innovation or an original 
sin depends on the speaker. As we shall see, the truth of this claim is mixed, in 
ways that those citing Parke-Davis have not appreciated. Learned Hand’s 
opinion was not much of a legal innovation; nor, for a long time, was it a 
widely cited precedent in patent law—yet it was a formative moment in 
patenting practice.46 
Finally, there is the question of what to do with the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision on patenting nature, Mayo v. Prometheus.47 The patent in Mayo 
claimed a method of medical treatment, consisting simply of responding to 
certain observed natural correlations in patients’ metabolite levels after a drug 
injection. The Court decided unanimously that patents effectively claiming a 
 
 41.  See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 224 (noting that 
“Myriad has relied heavily on the holding of the Honorable Learned Hand in Parke-Davis & 
Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.”). 
 42.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, Defendants’ January 29 Memorandum at 1, 23. 
 43.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, Defendants’ December 23 Memorandum at 3, n.1 
(citing Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by Sec. 103 of the 
1952 Patent Act, 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 855, 860 (1964) (republished in 14 Fed. Cir. B.J. 
147, 155 (2004)). 
 44.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 225. Judge Sweet also gently 
deflated the reverence for Learned Hand expressed in Myriad’s briefs. See id. at 225, n.46. 
 45.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (quoting John M. Conley 
& Roberte Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a 
Barrier to Biotechnology Patents (Part I), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 301, 305 
(2003)). 
 46.  See infra Part VI.D. 
 47.  Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Lab., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
268 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:229 
law of nature are invalid. The justices grounded their reasoning heavily in stare 
decisis,48 albeit while approving the rationale (avoiding “monopolization” of 
“basic tools of scientific and technological work”) that they found ubiquitous in 
the case law.49 Strikingly, the hundred-and-fifty-year line of authorities cited 
for a prohibition on patenting laws of nature is quite different from the group of 
decisions believed to bar patents on products of nature. Another challenge for 
the DNA-patent litigation is thus to figure out how these ancient lines of 
jurisprudence do or do not relate to each other. 
II. SEARCHING FOR THE ORIGINS OF THE PRODUCT-OF-NATURE DOCTRINE 
A. The Unpatentability of Natural Laws and Principles 
American courts resolved early on that “laws of nature”—including 
scientific theories, laws of physics, and other fundamental relationships of the 
natural world—could not be the basis of a patent. The question arose as a 
matter of patent scope. English judges in the late eighteenth century had 
extensively debated the question of whether a patent covered only a particular 
machine, or protected a more abstract concept, “the invention,” defined by the 
mode or principle that the inventor had put into effect.50 At its outer limit, this 
act of abstraction raised the troubling thought that a broad enough “principle” 
of operation might be tantamount to claiming the scientific theory of the 
invention, or even the natural forces underlying its working. Laws of nature 
were thus implicated in what one scholar has called the “levels of abstraction 
problem” characteristic of patent law.51 
In English law, the locus classicus of this issue was the litigation over 
James Watt’s pathbreaking steam engine patent. Watt’s assertion that his 
invention consisted of certain “principles”52 prompted several judges to 
announce that “the organization of a machine may be the subject of a patent, 
 
 48.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302 (stating that “[t]he presence here of the basic underlying 
concern that these patents tie up too much future use of laws of nature simply reinforces our 
conclusion that the processes described in the patents are not patent eligible, while 
eliminating any temptation to depart from case law precedent” (emphasis added)). 
 49.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. 
 50.  Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intellectual Property 
433-35 (June 2005) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on file with the 
University of Texas Law Faculty). 
 51.  Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1097 (2011). 
 52.  Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Bl. 463, 465, 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 652 (C.P. 1795) (quoting 
the patent as follows: “my method of lessening the consumption of steam, and consequently 
fuel in fire engines, consists of the following principles . . .”); see also Eric Robinson, James 
Watt and the Law of Patents, 13 TECH. & CULTURE 115, 119-20 (1972). 
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but principles cannot.”53 “If the principle alone be the foundation of this 
patent,” wrote Mr. Justice Buller, “it cannot possibly stand. . . . The effect, the 
power, and the operation of steam, were known long before the date of this 
patent.”54 For those judges who chose to read Watt’s patent as one for a “mere 
principle,” some mixture of indistinctness (“it seems impossible to specify a 
principle”) and lack of true novelty thus stood in the way of such a broadly-
drawn right. 
In the United States, a generally more receptive attitude toward patent 
grants led courts to accept protection that encompassed the “principle” of the 
invention.55 Nevertheless, leading voices in early American patent law took 
care to specify the limiting line drawn around this concept. Justice Joseph 
Story, a major architect of patent jurisprudence,56 stated that “the thing to be 
patented is not a mere elementary or intellectual discovery, but a principle put 
in practice, and applied to some art, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter.”57 Thus, for example, no patent could issue for “the admeasurement of 
time, or the expansive operations of steam.”58 Oliver Evans, one of the most 
assertive and high-profile patent-owners of the early Republic,59 similarly 
placed off-limits “[t]he eternal, immutable laws of nature, or nature’s God; 
viz. gravity, attraction, repulsion, adhesion . . . heat, light, electricity, 
galvanism, magnetism . . . &c. &c. &c.” on the grounds that they “cannot be 
invented or created by man; they have co-existed with eternity; and are 
common stock.”60 In the 1830s, one of the first treatise-writers to outline 
American patent law took it as axiomatic that “[a]ll the abstract philosophical 
truths that have been discovered, are free from the patent laws, as are the 
general powers and qualities of matter.”61 
Two things bear mention about this prohibition on patenting laws of nature. 
The first is that the bright line—between an unpatentable natural principle and 
 
 53.  Boulton, 2 H. Bl. at 482 (Heath, J.). 
 54.  Id. at 485-86 (Buller, J.). 
 55.  Bracha, supra note 50, at 440-42. After 1836, the patent statute explicitly invoked 
principles in describing the claim requirement: “in case of any machine, [the inventor] shall 
fully explain the principle and the several modes in which he has contemplated the 
application of that principle or character by which it may be distinguished from other 
inventions.” Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117, § 6. 
 56.  See e.g., Frank D. Prager, The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American Patent 
Law, 5 AM. J. LEGIS. HIST. 254 (1961); Frank D. Prager, The Changing Views of Justice 
Story on the Construction of Patents, 4 AM. J. LEGIS. HIST. 1 (1960). 
 57.  Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254, 256 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825). 
 58.  Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1124 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813); see also 
Bracha, supra note 50, at 440. 
 59.  P.J. Federico, The Patent Trials of Oliver Evans (pts. 1 & 2), 27 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 
586, 657 (1945). 
 60.  OLIVER EVANS, EXPOSITION OF PART OF THE PATENT LAW BY A NATIVE-BORN 
CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES 12-13 (1816) (emphasis in original). 
 61.  WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 110 (1837). 
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a legitimately patentable application of that principle—proved not to be a clear 
boundary in practice.62 In a series of nineteenth-century cases involving broad 
patent claims, the courts split as to whether particular patentees had crossed the 
threshold of permissible abstraction. Across technologies ranging from reaction 
water-wheels63 to lead-pipe-making64 to the telegraph65 and telephone,66 
judges struggled to decide whether broad patents covered concrete applications, 
or were drawn so broadly that they monopolized natural properties of fluid 
mechanics, metallurgy, or electro-magnetism. These cases produced some 
ringing declarations of what could not be patented, such as that in Le Roy v. 
Tatham (1853): 
A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; 
these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive 
right. Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new power, should one be 
discovered in addition to those already known.
67
 
Conversely, judges who sought to uphold similar patents stressed the 
inventors’ new and practical harnessing of nature’s properties: 
[W]here a person discovers a principle or property of nature, or where he 
conceives of a new application of a well-known principle or property of 
nature, and also, of some mode of carrying it out into practice . . . he is entitled 
to protection.
68
 
In their apparent consensus about the unpatentability of “nature,” then, the 
courts only underlined the difficulty of establishing where the laws of nature 
ended and the applications of human ingenuity began. 
A second point relates to the reasoning behind the prohibition on patenting 
natural phenomena. Two types of justification recurred in the cases. One was 
the pre-existence of natural truths, which were thus neither novel when 
discovered nor human inventions in themselves.69 By far the more common 
reason, though, was the danger of over-broad monopoly.70 As Justice Levi 
Woodbury put it, patenting any principle at a high level of abstraction would 
“halt and bar all further advances on the same subject. It would petrify 
everything as it stood, to the great loss of mankind . . . It would also render the 
first improver a monopolist, and exclude the exercise or reward of further 
 
 62.  See Bracha, supra note 50, at 448-71. 
 63.  Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849). 
 64.  Le Roy v. Tatham¸ 55 U.S. 156 (1852). 
 65.  O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
 66.  The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888). 
 67.  Le Roy v. Tatham¸ 55 U.S. at 175. 
 68.  Id. at 185. 
 69.  Although the background assumptions of this view were largely unstated, Joshua 
Sarnoff has argued that they drew on religious understandings of nature and creation: see 
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS 
L.J. 53, 84-90 (2011). 
 70.  See Bracha, supra note 50, at 450-60. 
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genius.”71 Those who favored broad patent claims were compelled to deny that 
such a “general claim, monopolizes the law, property or quality of matter which 
[the inventor] has applied . . . His patent leaves the law, property, or quality of 
matter, precisely where it found it, as common property, to be used by any 
one.”72 
The unpatentability of laws of nature has thus been—and continues to 
be73—based significantly on considerations of patent scope. However, relating 
the traditional prohibition to products of nature is problematic. Patenting a 
natural law represents a high level of abstraction and presents the potential for 
wide preemption of future uses, in a way that patenting a particular piece of 
biological material might not. As Judge Lourie of the Federal Circuit put it in 
Association for Molecular Pathology, “[a] composition of matter is not a law of 
nature . . . Any preemption thus is limited.”74 To understand the scope of 
patentability for natural products, then, we must look elsewhere. 
B. The Murky Origins of the Product-of-Nature Doctrine 
Descriptions of the prohibition on patenting products of nature are often 
hazy about its beginnings. Part of the problem is that some of the standard 
references are not actually product-of-nature decisions at all. In addition, the 
one canonical early authority that seems most on point was not nearly as 
influential or representative as has since been suggested. In the nineteenth 
century at least, there was very little by way of articulated law on this question. 
For example, the product-of-nature doctrine is sometimes traced to the 
1874 case of American Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co.75 This is 
an unfortunate instance of miscasting. In American Wood-Paper, the U.S. 
Supreme Court considered a claim for chemically-treated wood pulp 
 
 71.  Smith v. Downing, 22 F. Cas. 511, 519 (C.C.D. Mass. 1850). 
 72.  GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL 
INVENTIONS 15 (2d ed. 1854). 
 73.  See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012) 
(citation omitted) (“[E]ven though rewarding with patents those who discover new laws of 
nature and the like might well encourage their discovery, those laws and principles, 
considered generally, are ‘the basic tools of scientific and technological work.’ And so there 
is a danger that the grant of patents that tie up their use will inhibit future innovation 
premised upon them . . . or otherwise forecloses more future invention than the underlying 
discovery could reasonably justify.”). See also Mark Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011). 
 74.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 75.  90 U.S. 566 (1874). See e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, 
Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the 
Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 332 (2002) (“The Supreme Court’s first close 
examination of the patentability of ‘purified’ natural products was the 1874 case American 
Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co.”). 
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(essentially, cellulose extracted from wood), and rejected the patent for want of 
novelty. Because the case featured natural materials and was extensively cited 
in later decisions about extraction and purification, commentators have 
periodically leapt to the conclusion that it turned on the unpatentability of 
naturally-existing cellulose.76 In fact, the Court found that cellulose from 
vegetable fiber had been “produced and used in the manufacture of paper long 
before” the date of the patent.77 The patent was invalid because of the man-
made prior art, rather than from anything to do with the natural existence of 
cellulose in wood.78 
The next canonical decision in the supposed product-of-nature line is 
Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik (BASF).79 Here, the notion of an 
operative product-of-nature prohibition would initially seem to be on more 
solid ground. The German chemical firm BASF held an extremely valuable 
U.S. patent for synthetic alizarine, a red dye produced from coal tar. Alizarine 
had long been obtained in natural form from the root of the madder plant. 
Accordingly, the defendant argued to the Supreme Court, inter alia, “that 
alizarine is a natural product, having a well-known definite constitution; that it 
is not a composition of matter, within the meaning of the statute, but has been 
well known in the arts, from time immemorial, for the purpose of dyeing.”80 
This was a novelty defense that overlapped with a product-of-nature argument: 
artificial alizarine was not new because it was chemically identical to the 
natural dye in the prior art. 
The Supreme Court, however, largely disregarded the product-of-nature 
argument. Justice Blatchford’s opinion focused on the defendant’s non-
infringement, finding it “so clear that the defendants are not shown to have 
infringed that we have not deemed it necessary to consider other questions any 
 
 76.  See e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 223 (“Courts have also 
specifically held that “purification” of a natural compound, without more, is insufficient to 
render a product of nature patentable. In The American Wood-Paper Co. v. The Fibre 
Disintegrating Co., the Supreme Court held that refined cellulose, consisting of purified pulp 
derived from wood and vegetable, was unpatentable because it was ‘an extract obtained by 
the decomposition or disintegration of material substance.’” (internal citations omitted)); 
Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 947 (2011) 
(“Historically, purified natural products were not always patentable”). 
 77.  American Wood-Paper Co., 90 U.S. at 594. 
 78.  Note, however, that the circuit court opinion below included language that came 
close to a product-of-nature argument. See American Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre 
Disintegrating Co., 1 F. Cas. 728, 729 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1868) (“I should feel bound to say that 
it appears impossible to consider that to be a new material, patentable as a new product, 
which is simply a substance long well-known to exist in wood . . . left in a state ‘nearly 
pure,’ and consequently fit for the manufacture of paper.”). The Supreme Court nowhere 
endorsed this position. 
 79.  Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293 (1884). 
 80.  Id. at 297. 
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further.”81 Blatchford thus hovered on the cusp of dicta when he briefly noted 
“another view of the case,” in which the synthetic alizarine was an “old 
article . . . [which] could not be patented, even though it was a product made 
artificially for the first time . . . Calling it artificial alizarine did not make it a 
new composition of matter, and patentable as such.”82 Later product-of-nature 
cases repeatedly cited Cochrane v. BASF, just as they did American Wood-
Paper, but not because the patented substance had appeared in nature. Instead, 
the significance of the case lay in its indication that an old product derived from 
a new source or process could not be patented as though it were a new and 
distinct product in its own right. 
The first true product-of-nature decision came in 1889, and did not issue 
from a court at all, but as an opinion of the Commissioner of Patents. Ex parte 
Latimer concerned a fiber extracted from pine needles, the patentee claiming 
“as a new article of manufacture the fiber herein described, consisting of the 
cellular tissues of the Pinus australis eliminated in full lengths from the . . . 
pine needles and subdivided into long, pliant filaments.”83 The invention was a 
high-profile one: cotton farmers across the South were then embroiled in a 
“Great Jute Boycott” against the Jute Trust, which controlled the bagging of 
cotton; Latimer’s pine fiber offered an alternative to jute bagging material and 
was thus, as the opinion noted, “unquestionably very valuable.”84 
Commissioner Benton J. Hall (an Iowa lawyer-politician with no obvious stake 
in the Jute Boycott) acknowledged the political sensitivities of the invention by 
openly declaring his “anxiety, if possible, to secure to the applicant a patent.”85 
Even so, the Commissioner affirmed the patent examiner’s decision to reject 
the application, holding that the fiber was “a natural product and can no more 
be the subject of a patent in its natural state when freed from its surroundings 
than wheat which has been cut by . . . some new method of reaping can be 
patented as wheat cut by such a process.”86 
Ex parte Latimer cited no direct authority for its conclusion.87 Instead, 
Commissioner Hall pointed to the lack of human alteration of the extracted 
 
 81.  Id. at 309-312. 
 82.  Id. at 311. 
 83.  Ex parte Latimer, 1889 DEC. COMM’R PAT at 123. 
 84.  Id. at 127. See also To Fight the Jute Trust, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1889; The Story of 
an Industry. How Pine Bagging Came to Be Brought into Use, N. Y. TIMES, May 26, 1889; 
MICHAEL SCHWARTZ, RADICAL PROTEST AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: THE SOUTHERN FARMERS’ 
ALLIANCE AND COTTON TENANCY, 1880-1890, at 235-46 (1988). 
 85.  Ex parte Latimer, 1889 DEC. COMM’R PAT at 127. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  The Commissioner did mention—without endorsing—the cases cited by the Patent 
Examiner below: Cochrane v. BASF (cited for the point that a substance identical to that in 
the prior art cannot be patented), American Wood-Paper (paper pulps made from different 
vegetable substances deemed not patentable as separate products), and two other wood-pulp 
cases. Id. at 124. 
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fiber, which had not been “in any manner affected or produced by the process, 
or . . . in any wise been affected, changed, or altered.”88 Plant fiber in general 
was “a well known material, the knowledge of which is almost co-extensive 
with the human family”; at most, Latimer had discovered only the particular 
properties of the Pinus australis.89 And applicant’s “mere ascertaining of the 
character or quality of trees that grow in the forest . . . is not a patentable 
invention . . . any more than to find a new gem or jewel in the earth would 
entitle the discoverer to patent all gems which should be subsequently 
found.”90 
Behind these observations lay the logical conclusion of allowing the patent: 
“it would be possible for an element or a principle to be secured by patent,” and 
that ultimately “patents might be obtained upon the trees of the forest and the 
plants of the earth, which of course would be unreasonable and impossible.”91 
For good measure, the Commissioner warned darkly that if Latimer could 
secure a patent for the fiber of Pinus australis, “an alleged inventor in Germany 
[might] acquire a patent which would give him the exclusive use of the Pinus 
sylvestris.”92 
Ex parte Latimer was a completely on-point product-of-nature decision: a 
direct and powerful statement against the patentability of merely isolated or 
extracted natural materials. Before using the case as historical authority, 
though, it is worth asking whether it carried the weight that has subsequently 
been imputed to it. 
First, although Latimer is sometimes cited as an “example” of how the 
Patent Office denied patents for purified products of nature, it is not clear that 
the decision was representative.93 Patents certainly did issue for extracted 
natural products that were unaltered or barely altered from their natural state. 
Four months before the Latimer decision, Arthur Bailey of Newton, 
Massachusetts received a patent for clam juice that was merely extracted from 
the clam, filtered, and boiled.94 Patents subsequently issued for such products 
as resin extracted from vanilla beans95 and the isolated perfume of the orris 
 
 88.  Id. at 125. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 125-26. 
 92.  Id. at 126. 
 93.  C.f. Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 75, at 333 (“The Commissioner of Patents 
accordingly denied patent applications for purified products of nature throughout the 
nineteenth century. In the 1889 decision in Ex parte Latimer, for example . . .”). See also 
Michael D. Davis, The Patenting of Products of Nature, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. 
L.J. 293, 323 (1995) (“Initially, lower courts also viewed natural products as unpatentable. In 
Ex parte Latimer, for instance . . .”). 
 94.  Clam Extract, U.S. Patent No. 395,199 (filed Nov. 12, 1888) (issued Dec. 25, 
1888). 
 95.  Oleoresin of Vanilla, U.S. Patent No. 931,805 (issued Aug. 24, 1909) (describing 
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root.96 In 1898, the Scottish chemist Edward Stanford received a patent for the 
extracted active constituents of the sheep thyroid gland “in the form and 
condition and in the proportions in which they were originally present in the 
said gland.”97 The reasoning of Latimer was either disregarded in such 
instances or was so easily avoided (by “changes” like heating or filtering) as to 
be trivial.98 
There is also very little to suggest that Latimer was known beyond the 
Patent Office. The decision did not appear in the major patent treatises of the 
day, although these discussed patentable subject matter at length.99 No reported 
court decisions cited Latimer in the nineteenth century or the first seven 
decades of the twentieth. This absence cannot be explained by a complete lack 
of litigation arising on the relevant point of law:100 the case of Parke-Davis v. 
Mulford, for one, casts some doubt on that proposition, and the 1920s, 1930s, 
and 1940s saw a number of decisions that rejected patents on explicit product-
 
invention that differed from prior art vanilla extracts “principally in that it is an oleoresinous 
extract from the vanilla bean, and contains not alone the vanillin principle but a large part of 
the group of resins constituent in the bean”). 
 96.  Process for Making Ketone from Orris-Root, U.S. Patent No. 559,638 (issued May 
5, 1896) (claiming “[a]s a new product a fragrant ketone of the composition C13H20O, 
(natural violet ketone of orris-root)” and noting that “[w]hile extract of orris-root has 
heretofore been used, the aromatic principle has to my knowledge never been separated and 
used in its isolated condition”). 
 97.  Product from Thyroid Glands and Process for Making Same, U.S. Patent No. 
616,501 (issued Dec. 27, 1898). 
 98.  Conversely, it is all but impossible to tell how often Latimer was used to reject 
patents. Based on an electronic text search, the decision seems never to have been cited by 
name in the Decisions of the Commissioner of Patents during the next half-century. See Hein 
Online, Decisions of the Commissioner of Patents and of the United States Courts in Patent 
and Trademark Cases, 1869-1944. If Latimer had been an oft-used authority at the time—
even a clear, unchallenged authority—one would expect to see it cited at least occasionally 
on appeal to the Commissioner, if only to distinguish the case. 
 99.  See, e.g., WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS (3 
vols., 1890); ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA (3rd ed. 1895, 4th ed. 1904). As far as I can tell, Latimer was cited only in 
digests of Patent Office opinions and rules: see, e.g., AMOS W. HART, DIGEST OF DECISIONS 
OF LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE PATENT OFFICE AND THE UNITED STATES AND STATE COURTS IN 
PATENTS, TRADE-MARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND LABELS, 1886-1898, at 244 (1898) (where it was 
the only case listed under heading “Products of Nature”); GEORGE H. KNIGHT, PATENT 
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of-nature grounds. They do not mention Latimer either.101 
The point of this discussion is not to prove that products of nature were 
regularly deemed patentable: only a truly systematic search of issued patents 
could properly establish that. It seems more likely that any product-of-nature 
prohibition was in practice extremely narrow, and that any substance subjected 
to the slightest human alteration or processing was treated as a regular 
invention and assessed by standard criteria of novelty and inventiveness. At any 
rate, it seems as though the now-vaunted decision in Ex parte Latimer may 
have had limited purchase at the time. As of the early twentieth century, neither 
judicial precedent nor Patent Office practice supplied much guidance for the 
courts. 
C. The Advent of “Useful Difference” 
Nineteenth-century courts did not pronounce on patenting natural products 
as such. But the early twentieth century saw doctrinal innovations that would 
ultimately prove influential in the product-of-nature question. The most 
important of these doctrines was a concept that I will term “useful difference.” 
The idea was that an isolated natural substance could be the subject of a valid 
patent—that is, would be considered new, inventive, and sufficiently different 
from the prior art—if the act of isolation rendered it greatly more useful than 
the product in its natural state. As a mixture of what we would now think of as 
novelty (§102), utility (§101), and nonobviousness (§103) ideas, “useful 
difference” is a fine example of the kind of blended reasoning that shaped 
patentability before the 1952 Patent Act. 
The development of the “useful difference” concept had a technological 
context. It first arose in chemistry, one of the hotbeds of patent law. Chemical 
firms were among the pioneers of laboratory-based corporate research in the 
period around 1900. Along with electrical engineering, chemistry was the 
leading scientifically-oriented industrial sector of the day.102 As a technological 
matter, chemical innovation posed particular challenges for patent law. Many 
products of the new chemical age were synthetic copies based on natural-
product precursors, natural active principles in newly purified form, or closely-
related variants or analogs of prior-art chemical products.103 Courts were thus 
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periodically pressed to decide whether an old product produced in a new way 
could be the subject of a patent.104 More than anything else, the earlier cases of 
American Wood-Paper and Cochrane v. BASF had addressed themselves to this 
new-process-old-product issue.105 Cochrane was widely believed to have 
settled the issue against the patentability of old products obtained from new 
sources or by new means.106 
Crucially, though, questions remained about how differentiated a product 
had to be from the prior art in order to achieve patentability. Purification posed 
one such challenge: what to do about an invention that produced a previously-
known substance at a hitherto-unprecedented degree of purity? Dicta in 
American Wood-Paper suggested that “a slight difference in the degree of 
purity of an article” would not support a product patent.107 At least one court 
had consequently concluded that a product merely containing fewer impurities 
than appeared in the prior art would not be patentable.108 
As the pace of chemical innovation quickened, however, the courts proved 
willing to reward the practical gains that came with new, purer substances. 
Judges began to hold that greater utility provided grounds for a patent, even if 
the only difference between the new product and the prior art lay in the degree 
of purity.109 In Blumenthal v. Burell (1892), the Second Circuit found that an 
extract of the enzyme chymosin, “separated from pepsin, and uncombined with 
foreign substances . . . was not merely an improved, but an absolutely new, 
article, having its own distinctive nature.”110 In Union Carbide Co. v. 
American Carbide Co. (1910), the same court upheld a patent for calcium 
carbide in a new crystalline form, stating that “patentable novelty in a case like 
the present may be founded upon superior efficiency.”111 The opinion in Union 
 
 104.  The relationship between process and product is a recurring issue in the law of 
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Carbide explicitly referenced the real-world value of the invention as a 
consideration in its novelty decision: “To hold an important discovery which 
has given to the world a commercially new product—a product the high utility 
of which must be conceded—not entitled to protection for want of novelty, 
would, as it seems to us, be applying the patent statute to defeat its fundamental 
purposes.”112 As a later treatise on chemical patenting explained, “It is the 
utility which is controlling, and a composition having new utility, not 
previously obtainable by those skilled in the art is patentable even if it differs 
from another only in degree.”113 
This reasoning reached its most prominent expression in 1910, in a 
pharmaceutical case involving the German chemical giant, Bayer.114 
Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co. tested Bayer’s patent for aspirin 
(acetylsalicylic acid), “the best selling medicine on the market,” with sales of 
two million ounces per year.115 The popularity of the patented drug led to 
large-scale smuggling and imitation, which the German company countered 
through litigation.116 Chicago pharmaceutical wholesaler Edward A. 
Kuehmsted was one of the leading aspirin bootleggers and was chosen as the 
target of Bayer’s test case.117 
At trial, Kuehmsted argued that the aspirin invented and patented by 
Bayer’s scientist Felix Hoffman was not new. Salicylic acid had been known 
for many years as a remedy for rheumatism and fever, but it caused adverse 
side effects such as stomach pain. In the search for an improved remedy, 
acetylsalicylic acid had been produced in impure form, notably by the German 
chemist Johann Kraut. Kuehmsted’s arguments fell on deaf ears. The courts 
accepted that Kraut’s impure substance had been identified by the same 
chemical formula as aspirin but noted that those impurities had rendered the 
compound “comparatively useless.”118 In his substantially pure acetylsalicylic 
acid, Hoffman, on the other hand, had “produced a medicine indisputably 
beneficial to mankind—something new in a useful art, such as our patent policy 
was intended to promote.”119 As a result, even though “the two bodies [were] 
analytically the same, . . . Hoffmann’s recrystallized product [was] 
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therapeutically different.”120 The greater utility of the purified form made it a 
patentable invention. 
This was a test of “useful difference.”121 An isolated and purified 
substance had sufficient distinctiveness from the prior art because it possessed 
new therapeutic and commercial value. The rule of novelty-through-efficacy is 
unfamiliar to patent law today. As a conceptual matter, it entailed collapsing 
together a number of inquiries that would now be separate: those of novelty 
(difference from the prior art), utility (existence of some known use as a 
threshold qualification for patentability), and nonobviousness (use of “objective 
indicia” such as commercial success in demonstrating the presence of 
patentable invention).122 
In practice, the approach was a fairly straightforward policy of ensuring 
reward to the inventors of valuable inventions. This too is not technically the 
modern practice—patent law at least formally does not consider the value of 
the invention in resolving patentability—but was consistent with other patent 
doctrines at the time. Foremost of these was the notion of the “pioneer patent,” 
which afforded broader scope to breakthrough inventions.123 As one legal 
authority put it, “[t]he first inquiry is whether the patent is a primary one; that 
is, for a pioneer invention. . . In the case of a primary patent greater liberality is 
shown in construing its claims so as to protect it against equivalents.”124 
Early twentieth-century patent law thus included (at least) two possible 
approaches to the status of a purified natural product. On the one hand, Ex 
parte Latimer afforded a potential bar to substances entirely unmodified from 
their natural state. On the other, chemical patent decisions gave great weight to 
any hint of a modification from the prior art if it provided the crucial step to the 
creation of a valuable new product. Of these two strains, only the latter had a 
visible effect on the business of medical technology. For those working to 
develop medicines from the emerging corpus of biological knowledge, there 
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was thus ample reason to hope for the protection of the law. 
III. SCIENTIFIC INDUSTRY, PATENT CULTURES, AND PATENT LAW IN THE EARLY 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
If one period provided the hinge in product-of-nature patenting—both as 
law and as practice—it was the first third of the twentieth century. By the 
beginning of the 1930s, patents had successfully issued for a range of isolated 
biological materials, and the courts had elaborated rationales that would later 
delineate and justify their patentability. 
These events did not take place in a world of legal abstraction. Far from it: 
the circumstances were freighted with contemporary concerns over science, 
medicine, and political economy. Understanding the evolving doctrine of 
patentable subject matter requires some attention to each of these contexts. 
A. American Pharmaceuticals and Patent Skepticism 
For most of the nineteenth century, the supply of medicines in America had 
been dominated by purveyors of “nostrums” or “patent medicines”—a 
misnomer, since most were unpatented and were protected, if at all, via 
trademarks and trade secrets. The makers of popular “patent” medicines were, 
first and foremost, pioneers of marketing, superbly successful at promoting 
branded products whose all-purpose active ingredients were often alcohol or 
opium.125 Eventually the gap between these products’ advertised promise and 
their therapeutic reality became a public and political liability. Proprietary 
medicines faced a growing chorus of criticism from physicians and pharmacists 
on grounds of their quackery and blatant commercialism. By the turn of the 
twentieth century, muckraking exposés of the “Great American Fraud” had 
made patent medicines a byword for abuse and a regulatory target of the 
Progressive Era’s pure food and drug movement.126 
In this climate, a new generation of emerging pharmaceutical companies 
worked hard to distinguish themselves from the peddlers of nostrums. They 
adopted the label of “ethical” manufacturers, aligning themselves with the 
assertive respectability of the medical profession.127 One of the earliest such 
firms was Parke-Davis, founded in Detroit as a partnership between Hervey 
Coke Parke and George S. Davis. After incorporating in 1875, Parke-Davis was 
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soon joined in the drug manufacturing business by a group of companies that 
included Eli Lilly, G.D. Searle, and Abbott Laboratories.128 The H. K. Mulford 
Company was a later arrival: a prosperous Philadelphia pharmacy that turned to 
manufacturing in 1891, licensed newly-developed tablet-making machinery, 
and quickly joined the front rank of pharmaceutical suppliers.129 As the century 
drew to a close, these “ethical” companies undertook to become self-
consciously scientific enterprises. Firms hired medical men and constructed 
laboratories for quality control and research. Parke-Davis & Co., one of the 
pioneers of this practice, formed close relationships with the University of 
Michigan. H. K. Mulford did the same with the Philadelphia College of 
Pharmacy.130 During the late 1890s, the two firms competed for the title of 
“most advanced scientifically.”131 
Medical discoveries, meanwhile, began to move the drug trade beyond the 
panaceas of yesteryear. The basic stock-in-trade of the “ethical” companies 
during the 1890s still consisted of botanicals and simple chemical compounds, 
together forming the materia medica, or storehouse of known remedies.132 
New scientific products were emerging, however. First, research in industrial 
chemistry began to spin off medical applications. German chemists working 
with the materials of the dye industry developed the earliest modern 
pharmaceutical products, starting with a series of antipyretics (fever reducers) 
that appeared in the 1880s, and continuing in the 1890s with acetylsalicylic 
acid (then trademarked, and now known generically, as aspirin).133 British and 
American experimenters focused more on biological research and on the 
extraction and purification of natural substances.134 Research into the glandular 
products that would soon be known as hormones met with promising results in 
the mid-1890s.135 Also in the 1890s, diphtheria antitoxin became the first 
widely deployed biological therapeutic to emerge from scientific medicine, 
demonstrating the possibilities of the bacteriological understanding of disease. 
As the subject of an immediate distribution campaign by U.S. public health 
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authorities, this antitoxin also became the first real bulk-manufacturing 
mainstay of the “ethical” drug companies, Parke-Davis and Mulford 
included.136 
The place of patents in these new pharmaceutical fields was a delicate 
question. The “ethical” companies’ priorities lay in cozying up to the medical 
profession and holding the old patent-medicine trade at arm’s length. Thanks in 
part to the disrepute of the nostrum business and in part to the non-commercial 
pretensions of the medical profession, the organized medical establishment had 
a longstanding policy against doctors patenting any drug, instrument, or 
surgical technique. Individual physicians did take out patents, but the 
profession’s official disapproval of patents was repeatedly reaffirmed.137 
Pharmaceutical companies took varying approaches in response. H. K. 
Mulford went furthest to accommodate the anti-patent norm. In 1900 the firm 
adopted the “Statement of the Relations of the H. K. Mulford Company to the 
Medical and Pharmaceutical Professions,” whose first pledge was to forswear 
“monopoly obtained either by secret formulas or processes or product 
patents.”138 Parke-Davis & Co. took a somewhat different tack. Although it 
declined to seek patents on any of its products during the 1880s, Parke-Davis 
became increasingly comfortable with selling patented products in the 
1890s.139 Even so, patenting and patent enforcement were not central aspects of 
the company’s strategy. Like other American pharmaceutical firms, Parke-
Davis only gradually embraced patents as a business tool.140 
B. Synthetic Drugs and the German Invasion 
One group did patent drugs in the United States: the Germans. The late-
nineteenth-century revolution in scientific drug-making was primarily a 
German achievement, led by that country’s world-leading universities and 
pioneering corporate researchers in the chemical industry.141 The synthetic 
pharmaceutical sector essentially began as a spin-off from dyestuff production, 
which was the major industrial application of chemistry. Phenacetin, the 
leading antipyretic, was developed by scientists at Bayer AG from the waste 
products of coal-tar dyes. Aspirin, whose active ingredient had been previously 
discovered in willow bark, did not become an effective medicinal substance 
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until synthesized from coal tar by Bayer scientists in 1897.142 
Having emerged within the industrial chemical sector, German synthetic 
drug makers quickly adopted that industry’s intensive and sophisticated 
patenting behavior, both at home and abroad. German chemical companies 
delighted in the use of American and British patent laws to leverage their 
formidable lead in laboratory-based research and development. German firms 
like BASF, Hoechst, AGFA, and Bayer sought patents in large numbers in the 
U.S. and U.K. By the turn of the century, German firms were receiving more 
than 75% of all British and American dye patents, and succeeded in gaining 
legal control over large swathes of those countries’ dyestuffs and chemicals 
markets as a result.143 
On a far smaller scale (simply because the market was far smaller), the 
same pattern was echoed in pharmaceuticals. Bayer held the American patents 
on phenacetin and aspirin, both of which were enforced against all comers 
through Bayer’s U.S. agent, the Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Company.144 
Another particularly controversial grant was Emil von Behring’s 1898 U.S. 
patent for diphtheria antitoxin. With American pharmaceutical companies 
already manufacturing the antitoxin in large quantities for distribution by 
public-health authorities, the appearance of this patent briefly threw the 
industry into panic. American firms vowed unified resistance, and 
commentators promised Behring “a harvest of shame and not the harvest of 
American dollars that he expected.”145 Both the Parke-Davis and Mulford 
companies publicly “agreed to fight the patent to the bitter end and to protect 
all users of their serums from any interference on the part of the holders of the 
patent.”146 Perhaps due to this determined opposition, Behring’s assignee 
Hoechst AG did not enforce the patent.147 
German patenting lent the whole question of drug patents in the United 
States a protectionist edge. Some of the most direct public-policy discussion of 
pharmaceutical patenting in the early twentieth century took place during 
debates over congressional bills that aimed to curtail foreign dominance. The 
Mann Bill of 1904 and the Paige and Edmonds Bills of 1915 proposed to 
eliminate drug product patents and to require that any drug-related patent be 
worked in the United States within two years of issue.148 The retail druggists’ 
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association that prepared the Mann bill clearly had Bayer’s phenacetin patent in 
mind: sponsoring Congressman James Mann waved a large package of the drug 
during hearings, complaining that what sold for $1 per ounce in the United 
States cost only $1 per pound across the Canadian border and in the rest of the 
world.149 
Despite these attempts to clear the field of product patents—or perhaps 
because of their failure—the eventual lesson learned by American firms was 
not to reject German scientific methods or patenting, but to imitate them. In 
retrospect, the history of medicine, business, and patents during this period 
echoes the story of the later gene patenting era. Questions were raised about the 
propriety of patenting medical compounds in the nineteenth century just as they 
were raised about patenting life in the twentieth, and for similar ethical and 
utilitarian reasons. In both periods, some of the institutions central to 
biomedical research were—at least initially—deeply ambivalent about 
patenting: the “ethical” pharmaceutical companies in the nineteenth century; 
bodies like the National Institutes of Health and (for a time) the universities in 
the twentieth. But perhaps fatefully, these hesitant patentees operated in close 
proximity to actors with aggressive patenting cultures, be they German 
chemical firms in the earlier period or American and multinational 
pharmaceutical companies later. If these parallels suggest anything, it is this: 
that cultures of intellectual property are not a given in the life sciences, but 
once awakened, they prove hard to stop. 
IV. THE ADRENALIN PATENT 
The patenting of adrenalin—and subsequent litigation over that patent—
was a key episode in the changing culture of American life science patenting. It 
later emerged as a seminal moment in the law of product-of-nature patenting as 
well. For a long time, the history of these events has not been well 
understood.150 For our purposes, that history illustrates three things. The 
process by which the adrenalin patent was obtained shows how “product of 
nature” issues were handled in the Patent Office, and notably how the limits of 
Ex parte Latimer were navigated. The litigation over adrenalin reveals the legal 
theory that settled patentability: not a judicial innovation as such, but the 
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application of the “useful difference” concept that had developed in chemical 
patent law. Finally, the aftermath of the Parke-Davis case shows that both the 
law and practice of natural-product patenting bore the mark of Learned Hand’s 
decision. 
A. Patenting Adrenalin 
Research into adrenalin grew out of discoveries in physiology and 
pharmacology. In 1894, the physician George Oliver and physiologist Edward 
Schäfer, of University College London, reported the blood-pressure-raising 
effects obtained from an extract of animal suprarenal (adrenal) glands. The 
therapeutic possibilities of this discovery for medical and surgical use spurred 
an immediate search for the active substance—or what chemists then called the 
active “principle.”151 In 1897, the Johns Hopkins pharmacologist John J. Abel 
(regarded as the “Father of Pharmacology” in the United States) produced a 
crystalline substance which he believed to be the active constituent of Oliver 
and Schäfer’s extract, albeit in impure form. Abel called his discovery 
“epinephrin,” and went on to publish descriptions and a chemical formula.152 
Meanwhile the Austrian chemist Otto von Fürth isolated a similar compound, 
which he called “suprarenin.”153 A form of Fürth’s glandular extract went to 
market, proving useful to medical practitioners. Unfortunately, the impurities in 
the extracted matter made it prone to rapid decomposition and dangerous to 
administer by injection.154 Further purification promised major therapeutic and 
commercial gains. The firm of Parke-Davis & Co. was soon in the hunt: 
Thomas Aldrich, a former colleague of Abel’s at Hopkins, had joined the 
company’s Biological Laboratory and set to work on further isolating the active 
principle.155 He would, however, not be the one to make the breakthrough. 
That role fell instead to Jokichi Takamine. Takamine was a Japanese 
chemist, educated in Tokyo and Glasgow, who had lived and worked in the 
United States since 1890. His background lay in agricultural chemistry and 
fertilizers, and he had briefly served as an official in the new Japanese patent 
office, but he had spent the bulk of his years in America developing a malt 
diastase: an enzyme product mainly used in distilling.156 Between 1889 and 
 
 151.  E. M. Tansey, What’s in a Name? Henry Dale and Adrenaline, 1906, 39 MED. 
HIST. 459, 464-65 (1995). 
 152.  JOHN PARASCANDOLA, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PHARMACOLOGY: JOHN J. 
ABEL AND THE SHAPING OF A DISCIPLINE 57-58 (1992). 
 153.  Tansey, supra note 152, at 465. 
 154.  Jokichi Takamine, Adrenalin the Active Principle of the Suprarenal Glands and Its 
Mode of Preparation, 73 AM. J. PHARM. 523, 523 (1901); Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 106; 
WALTER SNEADER, DRUG DISCOVERY: A HISTORY 155 (2005) (marketing of Fürth’s 
suprarenin by Hoechst). 
 155.  Horace W. Davenport, Epinephrin(e), 25 PHYSIOLOGIST 76, 78 (1982). 
 156.  DAVID L. COWEN, 21 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 265-66 (John A. Garraty 
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1896, Takamine took out a series of U.S. patents involving the fungal 
preparation known in Japan as koji, which he grew on moist bran to produce his 
diastase extract. 
Takamine failed to win over the distilling industry, but he did succeed in 
attracting a different client: Parke-Davis & Co., which undertook to market his 
diastase as a remedy for indigestion.157 “Taka-Diastase” proved successful, and 
Parke-Davis maintained its association with Takamine. At the company’s 
instigation and with a supply of fresh animal glands, Takamine began research 
on the active principle of the adrenal gland.158 Sometime before the fall of 
1900, Takamine succeeded in extracting the pure active principle from Abel’s 
compound by the relatively simple technique of precipitating it with 
ammonia.159 With this step, Takamine had succeeded in isolating the first 
ostensibly pure hormone.160 He called it “Adrenalin.” 
Takamine filed for a patent on his invention in November 1900. It is quite 
likely that this was of his own initiative, rather than that of Parke-Davis. 
Takamine had considerable experience and success with patenting. Parke-
Davis, while it had marketed patented products like Taka-Diastase, had at that 
point never purchased a patent prior to issue.161 It would not acquire 
Takamine’s adrenalin patents until May of 1904, nearly a year after they were 
granted. Even though the norms against pharmaceutical patenting had begun to 
soften before 1900, it is not self-evident that Parke-Davis would have sought to 
patent the new substance for itself. 
 
and Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999); Davenport, supra note 156, at 78-79. 
 157.  Davenport, supra note 155, at 79. 
 158.  Deposition of Frank G. Ryan, Apr. 5, 1910, Transcript of Record at 309-10, Parke-
Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (No. 4363) (on file at the 
National Archives and Records Administration at New York Region, New York City, Box 
1684, RG276) [hereinafter “Transcript of Record”] (Ryan’s testimony describes Takamine 
as “a chemist in the employ” of the company, but I have not been able to corroborate this 
description). See also Davenport, supra note 156, at 79 (noting that E. M. Houghton, 
Director of Parke-Davis’ Research Laboratory, performed physiological tests for Takamine). 
 159.  Davenport, supra note 156, at 79. 
 160.  Takamine’s extract later turned out to contain two hormones, adrenaline and 
noradrenaline (or epinephrine and norepinephrine). See PARASCANDOLA, supra note 153, at 
58. 
 161.  Patents could be assigned by the inventor to another firm or individual at the time 
of issue; when this happened, it usually reflected either an employment or financing 
relationship between the inventor and the assignee. See Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth 
L. Sokoloff, Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology: U.S. Manufacturing in the 
Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, in LEARNING BY DOING IN FIRMS, MARKETS, 
AND COUNTRIES 28-40 (Naomi Lamoreaux et al. eds., 1999). My conclusion that Parke-
Davis had received no assignments-on-issue before 1901 is based on a search of Google 
Patents; given the imperfections of text searching in this database, the conclusion should be 
regarded as tentative. The first patent that I can find assigned to Parke-Davis & Co. on issue 
is E. M. Houghton’s U.S. Patent 715,661, “Vaccinating Tool,” filed March 5, 1901, issued 
December 9, 1902. 
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In any case, Takamine faced legal obstacles in gaining his patent. 
Takamine’s original application, drafted by the New York patent solicitors 
Knight Bros., included seven process claims and two product claims. One 
product claim was for “[t]he product, Adrenalin, consisting of the active 
principle of the Suprarenal Glands, in a white, solid, crystalline form.”162 
Patent Office examiner James Littlewood, an experienced member of the 
Office’s Division of Chemistry, immediately rejected the claim as “drawn to a 
product of nature, merely isolated by applicant, and hence . . . not drawn to 
such patentable subject matter as required by statute.”163 Littlewood cited Ex 
parte Latimer and Cochrane v. BASF as authority without further elaboration. 
Knight Bros. may have been surprised by rejection on these grounds: their next 
communication did not rebut the examiner at length, but merely protested “that 
the compounds named here do not exist in a state of nature in the form defined 
by these claims . . . The product as it exists in nature is certainly not a white, 
solid, crystalline body.”164 The examiner reaffirmed the rejection, adding a 
citation to the Wood-Paper Patent Case.165 
In an amended application nearly a year later, Takamine’s lawyers now 
made a fuller version of their change-of-form argument. Taking Latimer as the 
“official interpretation” of the product-of-nature doctrine, they argued that the 
decision had turned on the fact that the fiber was in no way “‘affected, changed, 
or altered’ from its natural condition.”166 Latimer’s claim had “covered no 
more than a natural object, unchanged from native condition except that it was 
withdrawn or abstracted from its natural setting, as a pebble might be picked 
out of a mud bank,” and thus had been properly rejected for lack of novelty.167 
By contrast, Takamine’s active principle had never existed as a white, 
crystalline substance, and its “complete transformation” rendered it “therefore 
new.”168 The argument failed: Littlewood responded that the transformation 
was really no more than a separation; the active principle did not exist “free 
from impurities in nature; neither did Latimer’s fibre, but it did exist and 
therefore is not patentable.”169 
 
 162.  Jokichi Takamine, Patent Application for “Glandular Extractive Products,” Nov. 5, 
1900, Transcript of Record, supra note 158, at 872. 
 163.  Communication from Examiner, Dec. 7, 1900, Transcript of Record, supra note 
158, at 878. The second claim, Littlewood argued, disclosed nothing more about the salt than 
that it shared the properties of the natural principle; “The natural principle not being 
patentable, neither is this.” Id. 
 164.  Jokichi Takamine, Amendment, Oct. 22, 1901, Transcript of Record, supra note 
158, at 883. 
 165.  Communication from Examiner, Nov. 7, 1901, Transcript of Record, supra note 
158, at 884. 
 166.  Jokichi Takamine, Amendment, Sept. 25, 1902, Transcript of Record, supra note 
158, at 887 (quoting Ex parte Latimer). 
 167.  Id. at 888. 
 168.  Id. at 889. 
 169.  Communication from Examiner, Oct. 17, 1902, Transcript of Record, supra note 
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Thus foiled, Takamine changed course. In a new patent application 
containing sixteen product claims,170 Takamine reframed both what he claimed 
and how he claimed it. Instead of claiming “the active principle” of the gland, 
the claims now embraced “a substance having the herein-described 
characteristics and reactions of the suprarenal glands.”171 Accompanying 
remarks explained that the sixteen claims were framed “to distinguish and 
identify” the substance: some did so by specifying an appearance, others 
described a melting point, solubility, or reaction with a known chemical. 
Most importantly, Takamine’s attorneys now stressed the relationship 
between purity and function. They pointed out that the Commissioner in Ex 
parte Latimer had explicitly allowed for patentability if the inventor added 
“some new quality or function” which a natural substance “does not possess in 
its natural condition.”172 “Applicant is the first to produce a substance which is 
stable and does not deteriorate nor decompose on keeping,” they noted.173 
Accordingly, key claims specified the product “in a stable and concentrated 
form, and practically free from inert constituents.”174 An attached 
memorandum distinguishing the American Wood-Paper, Cochrane, and 
Latimer cases abandoned Takamine’s old emphasis on physical form, and 
focused on “definite properties and characteristics which [the glandular 
substance] does not possess in nature,” particularly “permanence and 
stability.”175 These also happened to be precisely the characteristics that made 
Takamine’s adrenalin a significant medical advance. 
That was enough. With the patent no longer framed as claiming an 
extracted active principle, but instead worded to claim a stable, purified, and 
concentrated compound whose effects tracked those of the adrenal glands, the 
application was approved and granted in June 1903 as U.S. Patent 730,176.176 
Takamine received a patent (no. 730,175) for his process claims on the same 
day, and a further patent for a salt of the active principle (no. 753,177) a few 
 
158, at 890. 
 170.  Process of Obtaining Adrenalin from Suprarenal Glands, U.S. Patent No. 730,175 
(filed Nov. 5, 1900) (issued June 2, 1903). With the product claims removed, the process 
claims of Takamine’s first application were approved and issued as U.S. Patent 730,175, 
“Process of Obtaining Products from Suprarenal Glands.” 
 171.  Jokichi Takamine, Application of Jan. 14, 1903, Amendment of Mar. 14, 1903, 
Transcript of Record, supra note 158, at 842-44 (explaining his sudden redefinition of his 
claimed substance by saying that further experiments had suggested the presence of other 
active principles in the gland, which he did not seek to claim); Takamine, Amendment of 
April 30, 1903, Transcript of Record, supra note 158, at 851-52. 
 172.  Id. at 847 (quoting Ex parte Latimer). 
 173.  Jokichi Takamine, Amendment of Mar. 14, 1903, Transcript of Record, supra note 
158,  at 845. 
 174.  Id. at 842-44. 
 175.  Id. at 846. 
 176.  Glandular Extractive Product, U.S. Patent No. 730,176 (filed Nov. 5, 1900) (issued 
June 2, 1903). 
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months later.177 
B. Adrenalin on Trial 
Parke-Davis & Co. began to market Adrenalin almost immediately after 
Takamine’s discovery. The hormone’s initial application was as a drug to stop 
bleeding in minor surgical procedures, making it particularly attractive to eye 
surgeons, dentists, and ear, nose, and throat specialists.178 By 1904, Parke-
Davis sold more than $200,000 worth of Adrenalin products. It was the firm’s 
greatest success to date.179 “As cocaine is to painless surgery,” the company 
boasted, “so Adrenalin [is] to bloodless surgery.”180 
In 1905, however, a number of other firms entered the market, cutting 
Parke-Davis’s sales nearly in half.181 That same year, the firm commenced 
litigation under the Takamine patents. Two suits were filed against the H. K. 
Mulford Company in the U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of New 
York, both alleging patent infringement by Mulford’s branded product 
Adrin.182 Parke-Davis chose to sue under its two product patents but not under 
its associated process patent. The reason, the company later explained, was that 
the process patent would not reach imported goods, and thus “to sustain the 
process without the product patent would be to discriminate against American 
manufacturers in favor of importers of foreign manufacture”— something the 
company “did not wish to do if it can be avoided.”183 Given that H. K. Mulford 
continued to trumpet its high-minded stance against drug product patents in 
general,184 it may have seemed wise for Parke-Davis to invoke the looming 
specter of German competition as a justification for wielding them. 
 
 177.  Process of Obtaining Adrenalin from Suprarenal Glands, U.S. Patent No. 730,175 
(filed Nov. 5, 1900); Glandular Extractive Compound, U.S. Patent No. 753,177 (filed May 
12, 1903). 
 178.  See, e.g., Sydney Stephenson, Ocular Therapeutics, 131 MEDICAL PRESS AND 
CIRCULAR 183, 183-84 (1905). 
 179.  Frank G. Ryan Dep., Transcript of Record, supra note 158, at 310-12. 
 180.  Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 196 F. 
496 (2d Cir. 1911) (No. 4363) (on file at the National Archives and Records Administration 
at New York Region, New York City, Box 1684, RG276) [hereinafter “Brief of Parke-
Davis”]. 
 181.  Transcript of Record, supra note 158, at 310. Companies offering rival products 
included Armour & Co. (Suprarenalin), Eli Lilly (Sanguestine), H.K. Mulford (Adrin), and 
others. The Suprarenal War, 16 PRACTICAL DRUGGIST AND REVIEW OF REVIEWS 328, 328 
(Aug. 1904). 
 182.  Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co.¸ cases S-9232 and S-9233, U.S. Circuit 
Court for the Southern District of New York. See Equity Docket, C.C.S.D.N.Y., Vo. S, 
RG21 (on file at the National Archives and Records Administration at New York Region, 
New York City) [hereinafter “Equity Docket”]. 
 183.  Brief of Parke-Davis, supra note 181, at 3. 
 184. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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The parties spent fully five years gathering evidence and testimony in the 
case. Attorneys for both sides were major figures of the patent bar.185 Both they 
and the principal expert witnesses were repeat players in such cases; notably, 
the lead attorney and the main expert for Parke-Davis had performed the same 
role for Bayer in the Kuehmsted aspirin litigation. The bulky record of 
proceedings was devoted mostly to the depositions of Charles F. Chandler, an 
eminent New York professor of chemistry and pharmacy, who testified for 
Parke-Davis & Co., and Samuel P. Sadtler, a longtime professor of organic and 
industrial chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania, who testified for 
Mulford.186 This material did much to give the case its unremitting density of 
technical detail as well as, in retrospect, the decision’s uneasy ruminations 
about partisan science in the courtroom. 
Eventually the record in Parke-Davis v. Mulford crashed onto the desk of a 
judge: one Billings Learned Hand. Learned Hand, as they say, needs no 
introduction, other than perhaps the widely-repeated assessment that he was 
“one of the four greatest judges of the first half of the twentieth century.”187 In 
years to come, he would be known, among other things, as a great authority in 
patent law.188 In early 1911 though, he was a relative novice on the bench, 
newly escaped from a disappointingly tepid career as a Wall Street lawyer.189 
By becoming a federal judge of the Southern District of New York, Hand had 
certainly put himself on the front line of American patent law. The Circuit 
Court190 of the S.D.N.Y. was the most important patent venue in the country, 
and suits of this kind made up a large part of its docket. In 1910 alone, nearly 
three hundred patent suits were filed in the district, or roughly twenty percent 
 
 185.  Livingston Gifford, the New York patent lawyer who had represented Bayer in the 
Kuehmsted case, appeared for Parke-Davis & Co. Howson & Howson, Philadelphia’s 
leading patent law firm, appeared for Mulford. 
 186.  Depositions of Chandler and Sadtler, Transcript of Record, supra note 158, at 17, 
404. Chandler had appeared for the patentees in Kuehmsted and in other cases involving 
BASF and Bayer; Sadtler had been the principal witness for the defense in at least one of the 
phenacetin cases. See, e.g., Kuehmsted, 179 F. at 703; Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik v. 
Higgin, 2 F. Cas. 348, 350 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1878); Maurer v. Dickerson, 113 F. 870, 872-73 
(3d Cir. 1902). 
 187.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at n.46 (quoting Remarks of the 
Honorable John M. Walker, Jr. Upon Receiving the Learned Hand Medal for Excellence in 
Federal Jurisprudence, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 595, 596 (2002)). 
 188.  See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 256, 258-
59, 313 (1994); Stephen H. Philbin, Judge Learned Hand and the Law of Patents and 
Copyrights, 60 HARV. L. REV. 394 (1947). 
 189.  On Judge Hand’s career at the bar, see GUNTHER, supra note 189. 
 190.  Not to be confused with the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, the U.S. Circuit 
Courts were a holdover from the pre-1891 days when justices of the Supreme Court had 
ridden circuit. For the most part, they functioned as trial courts operating with the territory 
and the bench of the corresponding District Court. The circuit courts were finally folded into 
the District Courts in 1911. While they existed, the Circuit Courts had exclusive jurisdiction 
over patent cases. See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 48 (2002). 
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of all civil suits commenced there.191 Judge Hand decided sixteen patent cases 
before he filed his opinion in Parke-Davis¸ having been on the court for all of 
twenty-four months.192 Fortunately Hand was well equipped for this type of 
work, being possessed of a powerful grasp of detail. He also manifested a 
healthy, longstanding skepticism about the value of adversarial expert 
testimony, having written an article ten years earlier on “Historical and 
Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony.”193 
Arguments in the trial record did not focus on the product-of-nature issue. 
If the parties’ contentions had a single major theme, it concerned the novelty of 
Takamine’s products in the face of various alleged anticipations by other 
scientists. John J. Abel and Otto von Fürth were the principal candidates to 
have pre-empted Takamine. Each had created compounds containing the active 
principle in combination with other substances.  Judge Hand decided, however, 
that these materials could not anticipate Takamine’s ‘176 patent for a purified 
extract of the adrenal gland. “[A]ll of [the] four alleged anticipating products 
never existed except in the form of a salt,” Hand reasoned, while Takamine’s 
claims were drawn only to the alkaline base of the active principle and were 
“especially designed to exclude a salt.”194 Takamine was thus not anticipated. 
Hand treated all other invalidity arguments—including the product-of-
nature argument—as “technical objections” to the patent.195 His response 
included the language that has become the classic holding of Parke-Davis. 
Defendant had contended that “the patent [was] only for a degree of purity, and 
therefore not for a new ‘composition of matter.’”196 Hand answered, in the first 
instance, that Takamine had been the first to isolate from the adrenal gland “a 
 
 191.  This percentage is highly approximate; 296 patent suits were filed in the calendar 
year 1910. See Docket Books and Case files of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of 
New York, RG21 (on file at the National Archives and Records Administration at New York 
Region, New York City). In the fiscal year 1910, 1,457 civil suits were commenced in the 
District and Circuit Courts of the district. See Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 149 (June 30, 1910). 
 192.  A full list of Hand’s district court decisions is given in the Finding Aid to the 
Learned Hand Papers at the Harvard Law School Library, available at 
http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~law00059. 
 193.  See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert 
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901). 
 194.  Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 102. Hand did find that Abel’s compound anticipated a 
claim of Takamine’s ‘177 patent, and that “Takamine cannot claim to have been the first to 
discover a stable and pure salt having the physiological activity of the suprarenal gland.” Id. 
at 110. 
 195.  Id. at 102-03. The other notable “technical objection” was to Takamine’s strategy 
of drafting overlapping claims of various different breadths, which the defendant argued was 
fraudulent and duplicative. Hand waved off these complaints by noting that “every prudent 
solicitor ought to” do the same, and expressing sympathy for the plight of the patent drafter 
steering between the risks of invalidity and too-narrow claiming: “To pass between this 
Scylla and the Charybdis, I think a patentee may fairly be entitled to bend sails upon many 
yards.” 
 196.  Id. at 103. 
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substance which was not in salt form.” Given testimony that the active 
principle existed naturally as a salt, Takamine’s production of a base was “a 
distinction not in degree, but in kind.”197 Famously, Hand then went on: 
But, even if it were merely an extracted product without change, there is no 
rule that such products are not patentable. Takamine was the first to make it 
available for any use by removing it from the other gland-tissue in which it 
was found, and, while it is of course possible logically to call this a 
purification of the principle, it became for every practical purpose a new thing 
commercially and therapeutically.
198
 
Of these statements, the last was the key. Hand left no doubt that his 
reasoning followed the pragmatic, inventor-rewarding rationale of recent cases 
such as Kuehmsted, the aspirin decision. “Everyone, not already saturated with 
scholastic distinctions,” the judge observed, “would recognize that Takamine’s 
crystals were not merely the old dried glands in a purer state . . . The line 
between different substances and degrees of the same substance is to be drawn 
rather from the common usages of men than from nice considerations of 
dialectic.” Concluding the opinion, Hand noted that “[w]hatever confusion the 
intricacy of the subject-matter causes, one fact stands out, which no one ought 
fairly to forget.” 
Before Takamine’s discovery the best experts were trying to get a practicable 
form of the active principle. The uses of the gland were so great that it became 
part of the usual therapy in the best form which was accessible. As soon as 
Takamine put out his discovery, other uses practically disappeared . . . . All 
this ought to count greatly for the validity of the patent, and Takamine has a 
great start, so to speak, from such facts . . . . [T]his is a case where he should 
be entitled to a lenient construction, for he has been author of a valuable 
invention and has succeeded where the most expert have failed.
199
 
Having upheld Takamine’s patents, all that remained for Hand was a 
comment on the shortcomings of patent adjudication more generally. Warming 
to the theme of his earlier article on expert testimony and to his generally 
technocratic Progressive philosophy, Hand vented his displeasure with the 
inefficiency of a generalist court being asked to tackle complex scientific 
problems. “I cannot stop,” he wrote, “without calling attention to the 
extraordinary condition of the law which makes it possible for a man without 
any knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to pass upon such questions 
as these. The inordinate expense of time is the least of the resulting evils, for 
only a trained chemist is really capable of passing upon such facts.”200 
Recalling that German courts called on neutral technical advisors to resolve 
scientific disputes, Hand issued a plea for just one further German import. 
“How long we shall continue to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan and 
 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 199.  Id. at 114-15. 
 200.  Id. at 115. 
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authoritative scientific assistance in the administration of justice, no one 
knows.”201 
C. Was Parke-Davis Rightly Decided? 
The two sides of the gene patenting debate differ over whether Parke-
Davis was rightly decided.202 At trial in Association for Molecular Pathology, 
counsel for the patent challengers branded Hand’s decision “erroneous” for two 
reasons. First, because it conflicted with the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
American Wood-Paper and Cochrane v. BASF.203 Second, the challengers 
argued that Hand had been wrong to rely on Kuehmsted and Union Carbide; 
these cases were “inapposite” because they dealt with man-made chemicals 
rather than naturally-occurring substances.204 
This second argument—call it the “nature is different” theory—falls flat. 
As discussed above,205 there was no clear natural/non-natural line in the 
judicial case law at the time of Parke-Davis. The prior decisions on extraction 
and purification treated these issues as questions of patentable novelty that 
might apply to any invention. Learned Hand might have chosen in Parke-Davis 
to propose such a categorical distinction, but his failure to do so is not a serious 
objection to the holding. 
Consistency with prior law is different matter. Jon Harkness, a scholar of 
medical history and law, has recently argued that the “greatest shortcoming” of 
Hand’s Parke-Davis opinion was “his failure to take Ex parte Latimer into 
account.”206 Harkness puts this down to a failure of knowledge on the part of 
the “inexperienced and under-informed” Judge Hand.207 He also attributes the 
PTO’s eventual acceptance of the Takamine patent, after initial rejection under 
 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  See, e.g., Myriad Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, F. Supp. 2d 181 (2010) 
(No. 09 Civ. 4515) [hereinafter “Defendants’ December 23 Memorandum”] (“Plaintiffs’ . . . 
argument depends upon convincing this Court that this long and consistent line of authority 
was the product of legal error after legal error after legal error. For example, plaintiffs say 
that Learned Hand’s holding that a purified natural substance (adrenaline) was patent-
eligible subject matter was ‘erroneous.’”). 
 203.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra note 14, at 24-25. As other commentators have 
pointed out, Hand did not even discuss the wood-paper case, other than to note that it had 
been raised by the Patent Office. See, e.g., Richard S. Gipstein, The Isolation and 
Purification Exception to the General Unpatentability of Products of Nature, 4 COLUM. SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 1, 21 (2003). 
 204.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra note 14, at 25; Gipstein, supra note 204, at 23. 
 205.  See infra, Part III.B. 
 206.  Harkness, supra note 151, at 391. 
 207.  Id. at 399. 
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Latimer, to the gradual “wearing down” of the examiner.208 On the strength of 
Latimer’s absence from the Parke-Davis deliberations, Harkness concludes that 
Parke-Davis was not a case where “the patentability of an isolated or purified 
product of nature” was at issue.209 
I disagree. Parke-Davis was a case about “the patentability of an isolated 
or purified product of nature” because it did, in fact, concern a patent for an 
isolated and purified product of nature. The fact that the case was not argued in 
terms of a “product of nature” doctrine says more about the lack of a clear 
doctrine than it does about the issues at stake. What happened at the Patent 
Office resulted from the limited scope of Ex parte Latimer, which prevented 
the examiner from allowing a “product . . . simply separated from impurities,” 
but fell away as an objection once Takamine redrafted his claims to emphasize 
the new character of his purified adrenal extract and the new utility allowed as 
a result.210 To say that the product-of-nature prohibition was so readily drafted 
around is also to say that it was not much of a prohibition. 
It is true that Latimer did not figure in the Parke-Davis trial (either in the 
briefing or the decision) and thus that the litigation cannot be considered as a 
direct referendum on the Latimer rule. But that should be a clue to us: not that 
the parties and the court misunderstood what was going on in the case,211 but 
that American law at that point lacked a robust product-of-nature category, 
distinct from questions of novelty, utility, and inventiveness. Modern skeptics 
of Parke-Davis are left arguing that Hand should have sua sponte invoked the 
Commissioner of Patents’ decision in Ex parte Latimer—not only giving that 
opinion its first judicial recognition, but also extending its holding to 
substances that had been purified as well as extracted, and which possessed 
new utilities and functions not found in nature.212 However, nothing required 
Hand to do so, and nobody asked. 
The remaining question is whether Parke-Davis conformed to the Supreme 
Court’s earlier rulings, American Wood-Paper and Cochrane v. BASF. Neither 
was a product-of-nature holding per se, but each suggested a rule that might 
bear on naturally-derived products as a class. Both decisions were understood 
to mean that an old product could not be patented simply because it came from 
a new source or was obtained by a new process.213 Applying these decisions to 
products derived from nature essentially meant treating the nature problem as a 
 
 208.  Id. at 391. 
 209.  Id. at 399. 
 210.  See infra, Part V.A. 
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 213.  See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text. 
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subset of the novelty inquiry: the claimed product could not be patented if it 
was in the prior art.214 Crucially, though, neither opinion decided where on the 
spectrum of changes to the prior art one should draw the line of patentable 
novelty. The Court in American Wood-Paper had “doubted” that a “slight 
difference” in purity could constitute a new product,215 but that mild statement 
left ample room for greater degrees of purification to confer patentability. 
Cochrane indicated that a synthetic product identical to the prior art substance 
could not be patented,216 but said nothing about the degree of variation that 
would be patentable. Neither case foreclosed the central holding of Parke-
Davis. 
Enter Kuehmsted and Union Carbide. The reasoning of these cases that a 
commercially-significant advance in purification constituted a meaningfully 
new product was a judicial innovation that barely pre-dated Parke-Davis. But it 
was nonetheless valid law, not foreclosed by earlier Supreme Court decisions, 
and in the case of the Second Circuit’s Union Carbide, binding precedent for 
Judge Hand. 
This does not mean that Hand’s opinion was wholly correct. The notorious 
line, “But, even if it were merely an extracted product without change, there is 
no rule that such products are not patentable,”217 pretty clearly runs afoul of 
American Wood-Paper and Cochrane. Furthermore, the statement was dicta: 
Hand did not construe Takamine’s invention as an “extracted product without 
change.”218 Most bizarrely, the assertion conflicted with the central reasoning 
of the Parke-Davis opinion itself, which was that commercially-transformative 
purification did constitute a change “in kind” that the patent law must 
recognize. However, as a much-quoted fragment of the Parke-Davis 
opinion,219 the phrase has made Hand’s position sound both broader and less 
reliable than it actually was. 
This is an unfortunate fact of the Parke-Davis legacy: patentability via 
mere extraction was not the crux of the ruling, but, as we shall see, has 
sometimes been taken as such. Loose language on the part of the author bears 
significant responsibility for this state of affairs. If he were now around to 
object, Learned Hand would mostly have himself to blame. 
 
 214.  Whether natural products are automatically in the prior art is an interesting 
question. By definition they are old, but prior art in the patent law is not identical with the 
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 215.  American Wood-Paper, 90 U.S. at 594. 
 216.  Cochrane, 111 U.S. at 311. 
 217.  Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 103 (emphasis added). 
 218.  Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 103. 
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V. THE PRACTICE AND LAW OF PATENTING NATURE AFTER PARKE-DAVIS 
The adrenalin case had two distinct legacies in American patent law. One 
was doctrinal: Learned Hand’s Parke-Davis decision eventually became a 
major—though sometimes misunderstood—precedent in the law of 
patentability. The other was practical: the adrenalin patent marked the 
beginning of changes in the practices of natural-product and pharmaceutical 
patenting. Given courts’ inclination to look at historical patent practice as an 
indicator of settled law, there is a kind of legal authority in this story too. 
A. Practice 
Parke-Davis has been treated by some as representative evidence that the 
United States has “long and unhesitatingly granted patent protection” to similar 
substances.220 As Judge Moore put it in Myriad, “The settled expectations of 
the inventing community with respect to isolated DNA claims are built upon 
[inter alia] . . . judicial precedent, such as Parke-Davis and Merck, and the 
Patent Office’s longstanding policy and practice,” including “a century-long 
history of affirming patent protection for isolated and purified biological 
products.”221 On the other side, Parke-Davis has been readily branded as a 
historical outlier or an error.222 
The truth is more interesting than either of these accounts. The adrenalin 
battle reveals changes in the culture and practices of life-science patenting—
changes of which adrenalin was both an example and a catalyst. Researchers, 
firms, and their lawyers learned the lessons of the Takamine patent, which in 
turn set a model for the next generation of patents on isolated naturally-
occurring products. 
Takamine’s adrenalin patent reflected a world in which principled 
resistance to biomedical product patenting was crumbling. In the shadow of the 
Kuehmsted and Parke-Davis cases, the distance between “ethical” 
pharmaceuticals and patented medicines finally dissolved. The courts observed 
no distinction, referring, for example, to patented aspirin as an “ethical remedy” 
in the Kuehmsted case.223 At the same time, the organized medical profession 
softened its stance. In 1909, the American Medical Association convened a 
Committee on Patents and Trade-Marks, which recommended that the body 
dispense with its opposition to product patents. Such grants were now 
sufficiently established, the group found, that abolishing them would be 
“impractical.”224 During the first decade of the twentieth century, much of the 
 
 220.  In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 975. 
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 222.  See, e.g., Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 75, at 339-45. 
 223.  Kuehmsted, 179 F. at 702. 
 224.  Gabriel, supra note 140, at 171. 
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medical profession had accepted the basic legitimacy of drug patents.225 
The reconciliation of pharmaceutical manufacturers to product patents was 
even more complete and more directly traceable to the adrenalin case. H.K. 
Mulford, the most outspoken of the holdouts, began the adrenalin suit by 
announcing “that in defending these suits it has consistently and at great cost 
endeavored to uphold its antagonistic position toward the product patent for 
medicinal substances, believing that product patents on all substances used in 
medicine work an injustice on the medical and pharmaceutical professions and 
are inimical to the public good.”226 The year after Hand’s decision though, 
Mulford abandoned its pledge and began to seek product patents.227 Not every 
protagonist in the adrenalin litigation had the same response. John J. Abel, the 
pioneering academic pharmacologist whose claim to the discovery of adrenalin 
lost out to Takamine’s patent, emerged from the litigation with a pronounced 
suspicion of commercialized science, and founded the American Society for 
Pharmacology with an explicit stance against drug patenting.228 Abel’s views 
were increasingly overtaken though, even within the academic community. 
What followed in the 1910s and 1920s was a procession of hormone 
discoveries, on which the adrenalin patent left a clear mark. In 1916, the 
biochemist Edward Kendall, who had worked at Parke-Davis in 1910-1911, 
applied for a patent on thyroxin. Kendall’s product claims closely tracked the 
language of Takamine’s: rather than claiming the hormone as such, they 
covered a “product, obtained from thyroid tissue, practically free from inert 
gland tissue,” and functionally defined in terms of its “physiological properties 
of producing tachycardia.”229 
The most important deployment of the Takamine format was insulin, the 
next great discovery of the “hormone era.”230 Insulin in isolated and purified 
form was first used to treat diabetes by scientists and physicians at the 
University of Toronto in 1922. Conscious of the value of their breakthrough 
and wanting to direct and regulate the development of an effective but 
potentially dangerous treatment, the Toronto team decided to seek a patent for 
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their compound.231 J. J. R. Macleod, the director of the university’s 
physiological laboratory, identified Takamine’s adrenalin and Kendall’s 
thyroxin patents as the primary precedents for such a step. Macleod also sought 
out advice directly from Kendall, then at the Mayo Clinic, and from lawyers at 
the Eli Lilly pharmaceutical company.232 Based on these sources, the Toronto 
researchers produced a patent essentially following Takamine’s 1903 claim 
language. The patent described the “hormone in practically pure form,” with 
product claims covering a “concentrated form” of the glandular insulin extract 
“practically free from inert and associated gland tissue and injurious 
substances” and defined by its blood-sugar decreasing effect.233 Insulin was 
neither the first hormone to be patented after adrenalin nor the first such patent 
to use Takamine-style claims,234 but it emphatically placed a landmark 
breakthrough in biological science under the aegis of the patent system. Two 
members of the Toronto team shared the Nobel Prize for medicine in the year 
that the patent issued.235 
The final piece of the puzzle was university management of hormone 
patents. The practice was pioneered by the University of California professor T. 
Brailsford Robertson, who assigned rights to his pituitary extract to the 
University.236 Edward Kendall, of the Mayo Clinic, took a further step by 
assigning his thyroxin rights to the University of Minnesota, on the condition 
that it organize the commercial exploitation of the drug in the interests of the 
medical profession.237 The University licensed production to the Squibb 
pharmaceutical firm but used its license to control production quality and the 
final price of the product. Toronto followed a similar arrangement, establishing 
an Insulin Committee to regulate the quality and price of insulin and issuing 
non-exclusive licenses to pharmaceutical manufacturers.238 
University patent management cemented two trends. One was academic 
scientists’ growing willingness to patent important biological discoveries. 
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University research came to include not only hormones but also vitamins, the 
next clutch of arguably-natural products to receive patent protection.239 The 
other trend was legal acceptance of the hormone patents themselves—a process 
that was confirmed by judicial silence as much as anything else. When the 
Toronto researchers sought their patent for insulin, questions were raised about 
its validity, including on product-of-nature grounds.240 No legal challenge 
emerged, however, thanks to the University’s policy of granting non-exclusive 
licenses to multiple pharmaceutical manufacturers. In the absence of patent-
based competition, Eli Lilly’s scientific director could reassure the patentees 
that American pharmaceutical companies had “too much at stake themselves to 
care to provoke a fight of this nature.”241 By the beginning of the 1930s, 
hormone patents were sufficiently conventional at the Patent Office that they 
simply claimed “the hormone,” rather than using the circumspect and 
functional claiming of earlier decades.242 As a matter of practice, Takamine 
and his imitators had established a space for patents covering isolated 
biological material. 
B. Law 
As a matter of black-letter law, however, natural-product patents 
encountered a much clearer set of prohibitions in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. 
During these years, the political and judicial climate turned sharply against 
patents.243 Progressive-Era and New Deal suspicion of corporate monopoly 
began to produce greater restrictions on business uses of patent rights. Around 
the turn of the century, courts had rebuffed challenges to anticompetitive patent 
strategies with statements like, “Within his domain, the patentee is czar. The 
people must take the invention on the terms he dictates.”244 Two decades later, 
the treatment of practices such as patent pooling, tying, cartelization, and other 
restrictive licensing was moving from “approval” and “indifference” to 
“disapproval” and “strict interpretation.”245 The Antitrust Division of the 
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Department of Justice conducted aggressive litigation throughout the 1920s and 
1930s, including a series of pitched battles with corporate giants General 
Electric, AT&T, and RCA.246 Governmental skepticism of patent power 
reached a peak with the Temporary National Economic Committee, a 
congressional body established in 1938, whose reports described a world of 
closed “corporate estates” fenced off by thousands of patents.247 
More diffusely, courts applied greater skepticism to issues of patent 
validity. U.S. Courts of Appeals upheld 46% of adjudicated patents in 1921-30, 
34% in 1931-40, and 22% in 1941-50248—an imperfect measure of judicial 
attitudes,249 but one that contemporaries took to indicate a growing hostility to 
patent rights. This was the era of Justice William O. Douglas’s notorious 
pronouncement that patentable invention required nothing less than “the flash 
of creative genius,”250 and of Justice Robert Jackson’s lament that “the only 
patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands 
on.”251 
It was in this context that a new group of product-of-nature decisions 
emerged. General Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio Co.252 involved GE’s 
Coolidge patent for improved tungsten lamp filaments. The Coolidge patent 
was one of the three principal patents through which GE controlled 70% of the 
country’s electric lamp business, and which had been the subject of a bitterly-
fought antitrust action decided against the government by the Supreme Court in 
1926.253 Among his claims, Coolidge had included one for “[s]ubstantially 
pure tungsten having ductility and high tensile strength,” and others for 
tungsten and tungsten wire with ductile and pliable qualities.254 One threshold 
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question in the case was whether Coolidge had claimed a new and artificial 
form of the metal, as the inventor and others had apparently maintained, or a 
pure form of natural tungsten.255 Finding that Coolidge had claimed “the 
tungsten of nature,” the Third Circuit held that “he cannot have a patent for it 
because a patent cannot be awarded for a discovery or for a product of nature, 
or for a chemical element.”256 The court did not cite on-point authority for its 
premise, but appeared to be following the district court’s determination below 
that the ductility of tungsten was “a discovered, inherent property, not an 
invented one.”257 General Electric v. De Forest soon had consequences for 
similar claims. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals followed the Third 
Circuit in rejecting patent applications for ductile uranium258 and ductile 
vanadium,259 holding that the purity and ductility of the claimed metals were 
each “a quality of a natural product and as such . . . not patentable.”260 
In the biotechnology context, the outstanding anti-patentability decision of 
these years was Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,261 decided by 
the Supreme Court in 1948. Unlike the metals cases, which are primarily cited 
now as examples of a longstanding bar on patents for natural products, Funk 
Brothers is one of the two or three leading precedents guiding the Myriad 
courts’ rulings, and its reasoning has come in for much scrutiny.262 The 
invention in question was an “inoculant package” containing multiple species 
of bacteria useful in enhancing the nitrogen-fixing activities of crops. Previous 
inoculants had contained only one species at a time, because otherwise the 
bacteria inhibited each other when combined. Bond, the inventor of the patent 
at issue, had discovered certain strains that did not have the mutually inhibitory 
effect, and had patented the mixed culture.263 At trial, the district court had 
“with reluctance” found that Bond had merely discovered a law of nature 
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(meaning the natural non-inhibition of the particular strains), and that his 
combined product was thus unpatentable.264 The Seventh Circuit reversed, on 
the grounds that Bond’s true contribution was an “application of scientific 
knowledge to things existing in nature and the utilization of them in a desirable 
composite product which had not been previously achieved.”265 The Supreme 
Court, in an opinion by leading patent skeptic William O. Douglas, reversed 
again, and invalidated the patent. 
The Supreme Court’s Funk Brothers decision made two moves. The first 
was to issue a general statement that laws of nature are unpatentable: 
Bond does not create state of inhibition or of non-inhibition in the bacteria. 
Their qualities are the work of nature. Those qualities are of course not 
patentable. For patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of 
nature. The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or 
the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. 
They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of 
nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to 
be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the 
law of nature to a new and useful end.
266
 
The second step was to deem Bond’s particular application of the discovery 
unpatentable. Despite the commercial usefulness of the mixed culture, the 
mixture itself fell “short of invention within the meaning of the patent 
statutes.”267 “[O]nce nature’s secret of the non-inhibitive quality of certain 
strains of the species of Rhizobium was discovered,” Justice Douglas 
explained, “the state of the art made the production of a mixed inoculant a 
simple step. Even though it may have been the product of skill, it certainly was 
not the product of invention.”268 
Funk Brothers was a recapitulation of the nineteenth-century law-of-nature 
cases,269 with all their attendant dilemmas about where to locate the line 
between the unpatentable law of nature and its potentially patentable 
application. Douglas’s decision drew the demarcating line by declaring that 
obvious applications of a law of nature could not be patented, even if the 
natural phenomenon itself were a new and nonobvious discovery. The addition 
to the law-of-nature canon thus consisted essentially of updating it with the 
1940s Supreme Court’s steep inventiveness (i.e. nonobviousness) requirement. 
Largely absent from Funk Brothers and the preceding metals cases were 
Parke-Davis and the other “useful difference” cases. The patent-owner in Funk 
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Brothers cited Parke-Davis in the course of arguing that the combination was 
“for every practical purpose a new thing,”270 but the Court passed over the 
argument without comment. Nor did the metals cases have anything to say 
about the useful difference cases, despite their relevance to questions of purity 
and utility. During those years, Parke-Davis was in fact seldom cited for its 
(now) principal holding. Instead it was best known for Hand’s complaints about 
expert testimony and call for a system of scientific advisors in technical 
cases.271 Even as a patent case, Parke-Davis was generally cited for Hand’s 
remarks about claim multiplication and the advisability of a patentee drafting 
claims of various breadths.272 Only in the 1930s did Parke-Davis begin to 
show up as a precedent on patentable novelty, appearing in long string cites as 
a case in the Union Carbide line (patentable novelty demonstrated by 
commercial utility).273 
All of this changed in 1958, with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Merck & 
Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.274 The case coincided with the peak of 
Learned Hand’s prestige in the legal profession: three years before the judge’s 
death, and in the same year that he delivered his career-summing Holmes 
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Lectures at Harvard Law School.275 All this was not lost on the lawyers or 
judges in the case. The Merck opinion described a situation strikingly similar to 
that of Parke-Davis. It had long been known that something in cattle livers had 
therapeutic effects in treating pernicious anemia. In the late 1940s, scientists at 
Merck succeeded in isolating the active constituent, which they identified as 
vitamin B-12.276 As in the case of Parke-Davis and adrenalin, the isolated and 
purified product quickly supplanted the crude extracts previously on the 
market.277 Defendants in Merck v. Olin Mathieson argued that the B-12 patent 
claimed a product of nature, and succeeded in prevailing at the district court on 
these grounds.278 
The Fourth Circuit reversed. Strikingly, the court dismissed outright the 
notion of a categorical product-of-nature bar and stated that “where the 
requirements of the Act are met, patents upon products of nature are granted 
and their validity sustained.”279 Citing Parke-Davis “illustratively,” but 
following its reasoning closely, the court upheld the patent based on the troika 
of Parke-Davis, Kuehmsted, and Union Carbide.280 The rationale of novelty-
through-greater-utility carried the day: “[t]he compositions of the patent here,” 
stated the opinion, “. . . never existed before; there was nothing comparable to 
them. . . . The new products are not the same as the old, but new and useful 
compositions entitled to the protection of the patent.”281 
Merck marked the arrival of Parke-Davis as a standard reference in the 
case law. At the same time, the Merck opinion became the source for the 
“canon” of standard historical references on product-of-nature patents. Broadly 
speaking, this featured American Wood-Paper, Cochrane, the metals cases, and 
Funk Brothers appearing on the anti-patentability side; and Parke-Davis, 
Kuehmsted, and Union Carbide on the side of patentability for significantly 
isolated and purified products. Merck itself immediately joined the set of 
precedents for patenting products of nature, while Ex parte Latimer would 
eventually be discovered by the courts as an anti-patentability authority during 
the 1970s.282 
 
 275.  LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958). 
 276.  Merck & Co., 253 F.2d at 157-61. Merck obtained the vitamin both as an extract 
from cattle livers and as the product of micro-organisms (the latter being the process claimed 
in the patent). Id. at 160. 
 277.  Id. at 158. 
 278.  Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 152 F. Supp. 690, 694-700 (W.D. 
Va. 1957), rev’d, 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958). The court also noted that most of the original 
product claims in the relevant patent application had been rejected by the Patent Office on 
product-of-nature grounds. Id. at 696. 
 279.  Merck & Co., 253 F.2d at 162. 
 280.  Id. at 162-63. 
 281.  Id. at 164. 
 282.  See, e.g., John M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking 
the Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents (Part I), 85 J. PAT. & 
 
Winter 2013] PATENTING NATURE 305 
The next step in the ascendancy of Parke-Davis was the biotechnology 
revolution of the late twentieth century. Parke-Davis made cameo appearances 
in the lower courts during the two pivotal genetic engineering cases, 
Chakrabarty and In re Bergy.283 The most forceful reference to Hand’s 
decision appeared in the pro-patentability opinion of Judge Giles Rich, then on 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and by some distance the most 
influential patent judge of his era. Rich asserted that “[t]he law has long and 
unhesitatingly granted patent protection to new, useful, and unobvious 
chemical compounds and compositions, in which category are to be found such 
important products of microbiological process as vitamin B-12 and adrenalin 
and countless other pharmaceuticals.”284 
The apotheosis of Parke-Davis arrived in the 1990s and 2000s, on the heels 
of the first gene patents.285 After Chakrabarty—where the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office had attempted to hold the line against patenting living 
organisms on product-of-nature grounds—the PTO’s resistance ebbed, and the 
Office adopted a liberal approach to subject matter, especially towards claims 
to “isolated and purified” genetic material.286 The product-of-nature doctrine 
“all but disappear[ed] as a serious concern.”287 
This was the period when Parke-Davis became a staple of the law-review 
literature and a ready shorthand for the PTO’s policy. In 2001, after inviting 
public comments, the PTO issued revised Utility Examination Guidelines that 
defended and elaborated on its approach to gene patenting. Under the section 
dealing with the product-of-nature argument, the PTO took pains to point out 
that “patenting compositions or compounds isolated from nature follows well-
established principles, and is not a new practice.”288 The Guidelines then gave 
three examples: a patent for yeast issued to Louis Pasteur in 1873, a 1970 case 
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involving extracted prostaglandins, and—accompanied by extensive 
quotation—Judge Hand’s opinion in Parke-Davis.289 
So, did the PTO get Parke-Davis right? Not exactly. Tellingly, the PTO 
cited Hand’s dictum claiming that “no rule” rendered “an extracted product 
without change” unpatentable.290 Although the Guidelines also quoted Hand’s 
note that Takamine’s adrenalin was “a new thing commercially and 
therapeutically,” the implication was clearly that isolation alone made it so. 
Under this logic, the Guidelines explained that isolated and purified DNA 
molecules are patentable (1) if isolated by extraction, because “that DNA 
molecule does not occur in that isolated form in nature”; and (2) if synthesized 
in pure form, “because their purified state is different from the naturally 
occurring compound.”291 
Absent from this analysis was the heart of the Parke-Davis holding: that 
Takamine’s product was patentable as an isolated and purified substance only 
because purification delivered a transformative difference in utility between the 
new product and its natural precursor. For commentators who worry that the 
Patent Office has come to treat “isolated and purified” as a test in its own 
right—and to wave through the patentability threshold any patent using that 
rubric292—the attention paid to Parke-Davis in current litigation is already 
providing a useful corrective. As Takamine’s lawyers themselves had stated 
before the Patent Office, there could be no patent for a product “unchanged 
from native condition except that it was withdrawn or abstracted from its 
natural setting, as a pebble might be picked out of a mud bank.”293 
C. A New View of Parke-Davis at the Federal Circuit? 
Back, then, to Myriad, the gene-patent challenge. There are signs that the 
appellate litigation process has gradually weeded out some of the historical 
misconceptions surrounding the product-of-nature bar and its key 
precedents.294 Similarly, discussion of the exception for isolated materials 
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seems to have moderated: rather than arguing that Learned Hand’s decision in 
Parke-Davis was erroneous, the challengers’ brief on appeal in Myriad 
distinguished the case295 and argued that the opinion’s broad dicta were 
overruled by later decisions.296 In discussing isolation and purification, the 
U.S. Government’s heavyweight amicus brief placed Parke-Davis into context 
alongside Kuehmsted to argue that patentability depends on a difference of kind 
rather than on purification per se.297 
Nevertheless, how to treat Parke-Davis—and the whole isolated-materials 
line of cases—as legal authority remains a tricky question for the courts. As a 
District Court case, the precedential authority of Hand’s opinion itself is slight. 
Any strictly doctrinal value derived from the case comes from (a) treating its 
reasoning as compelling or “illustrative,” or (b) arguing that Hand’s decision 
inaugurated and represents a long unbroken tradition of case law. In either 
instance, it is important to be clear about what the reasoning of Parke-Davis 
actually was. To repeat: the decision held that an isolated and purified natural 
substance could be patentable, so long as the greater utility of the purified 
version made it functionally a new thing. This is the requirement that I have 
referred to as “useful difference.” 
Having arguably been disregarded in the Patent Office’s approach to gene 
patenting, this question of useful difference has returned with a bang in Myriad, 
to become one of the crucial fault-lines along which the Federal Circuit’s split 
opinions divide. One opinion eschews Hand’s basic reasoning, while two—on 
different sides of the result—embody it. The approach that each opinion takes 
toward Parke-Davis thus encapsulates the choices facing the U.S. Supreme 
Court going forward. 
Judge Lourie’s opinion upholding the BRCA claims298 rests the 
patentability of isolated DNA sequences entirely on the nature of the isolation 
itself. Lourie’s starting-point is that isolated DNA sequences are, as a factual 
matter, “markedly different—have a distinctive chemical identity and nature—
from molecules that exist in nature.”299 Extraction itself provides part of the 
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basis for this conclusion. Judge Lourie argues that the chemical bonds 
themselves are part of the nature of the native DNA, such that cleaving them or 
synthesizing a molecule without them produces a “distinct chemical entity.”300 
With this move, Judge Lourie simply side-steps the crucial problem for the 
would-be patentee of a product of nature. If DNA isolation definitively changes 
the source material, rather than merely abstracting it from its natural setting, 
then the case for patentability is vastly easier to establish under the governing 
Supreme Court precedents: Funk Brothers, denying protection to unmodified 
organisms, is distinguished, while Chakrabarty, allowing a patent for a 
“nonnaturally occurring . . . product of human ingenuity,” is satisfied.301 
It is in this context that Parke-Davis makes a guest appearance in Judge 
Lourie’s opinion, as a way to hammer home the distinction between what is and 
is not a meaningful change from nature. Parke-Davis, in the judge’s view, is 
distinguishable as a case about “purification,” a categorically different process 
involving the physical separation of the desired compound from a mixture.302 
By contrast, “the claimed isolated DNA molecules do not exist as in nature 
within a physical mixture to be purified,” but must be chemically cleaved to 
become free-standing entities.303 This distinction is less important than what 
Lourie doesn’t do with the case. The central aspect of Parke-Davis—the 
requirement that some greater utility accompany the change of form—remains 
absent from Judge Lourie’s opinion. 
The same is not true of the other voices on the court. Judge Moore, 
concurring in the result but writing separately, makes “useful difference” the 
centerpiece of her analysis. For Moore, the test of patentability is the presence 
of “markedly different characteristics with the potential for significant utility, 
e.g., an ‘enlargement of the range of . . . utility’ as compared to nature.”304 In 
constructing this test, Moore rests on the same Supreme Court precedents as 
Judge Lourie, Funk Brothers and Chakrabarty, but reads these cases to 
emphasize the need for useful difference.305 
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In effect, Moore treats these later Supreme Court decisions as having 
adopted the reasoning of Parke-Davis. For Judge Moore, Learned Hand’s 
opinion represented “an analogous patentability inquiry long before Funk 
Brothers or Chakrabarty.”306 Along with Merck v. Olin Mathieson (the Fourth 
Circuit’s vitamin B-12 ruling that was a direct descendant of Parke-Davis), 
these cases “weigh the same considerations”307 and demonstrate a consistent 
and “longstanding flexible approach.”308 This is a new slant on Funk Brothers 
and Chakrabarty, neither of which cited Parke-Davis or Merck or appeared 
consciously to adopt a “useful difference” standard (despite admittedly 
suggestive language). In that sense, Judge Moore’s opinion should be 
considered a notable posthumous coup for Learned Hand. 
The coup is all the more impressive for capturing a majority of the Federal 
Circuit panel. Judge Moore applies the useful difference standard to uphold the 
patent claims at issue in Myriad, finding sufficient new utility in the isolated 
DNA sequences to sustain their validity.309 By contrast, Judge Bryson’s dissent 
sides with the District Court in finding the relevant patent claims invalid.310 
The dissent devotes most of its energies to contesting Judge Lourie’s notion 
that isolation meaningfully changes the claimed DNA sequence. Among a 
series of memorable analogies, Judge Bryson likens the process of gene 
isolation to “snapping a leaf from a tree.”311 However, Bryson’s opinion 
similarly adopts useful difference as a necessary condition: “the test employed 
by the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty requires us to focus on two things: (1) 
the similarity in structure between what is claimed and what is found in nature 
and (2) the similarity in utility between what is claimed and what is found in 
nature.”312 
This may not be a bad way to apply Chakrabarty to the isolated-DNA 
debate; after all, as Judges Moore and Bryson point out, the 1980 decision does 
include “distinctive . . . use” alongside “distinctive name [and] character” in 
separating patentable invention from nature’s handiwork.313 It does, however, 
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mark a dramatic reversal of Parke-Davis’s lowly place in the precedential 
pecking-order: from a mere district court opinion, the decision has 
retrospectively become a guiding principle of later Supreme Court doctrine. 
This revived appreciation of Learned Hand’s reasoning means we might expect 
to see more of Parke-Davis as the gene-patent question proceeds to the 
Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Anyone looking for a historical “right” answer on the product-of-nature 
question will be disappointed. For all the spirited attempts to impose 
consistency on the case law of natural subject matter, it remains a kaleidoscope 
of doctrine: cases come at the question from different angles, in different 
historical contexts, with premises ranging from pragmatic to formalist and from 
patent-friendly to fiercely patent-skeptical. The same applies to the history of 
patent practice. Based on the evidence gathered above, we can say that patents 
for isolated (and/or barely modified) products of nature have been issued at 
some times, disdained at others, and have in some instances, such as the 
hormone patents of the 1930s, issued from the Patent Office even as the judicial 
climate turned against them. 
Even so, there are a few lessons we can draw from the history. Two stand 
out. One is that the historical foundations of the bar on patenting products of 
nature are surprisingly shaky. The prohibition on patenting laws of nature 
represented a separate set of concerns about scope and abstract claiming, which 
failed to supply either clear authority or a clear nature/application-of-nature 
guiding line for product patentees. Meanwhile, before the twentieth century, 
there was no jurisprudential category of “natural” products, only a set of rules 
about novelty and distinctiveness from the prior art that applied across 
technologies, without regard to natural origin. The purported great exception, 
Ex parte Latimer, was surprisingly marginal: unknown to the courts, it may 
have presented occasional claim-drafting challenges for patentees such as 
Takamine, but did not effectively block the patenting of broadly natural subject 
matter, either in its own time or later. Only in the 1920s did a clutch of stronger 
product-of-nature statements emerge from the federal circuit courts, staking out 
categorical language against patenting products of nature, but giving no 
indication that they had a precedential basis to rest on. 
By that time, of course, the law had opened up a space for patenting 
isolated natural substances. Again, this development emerged without a 
natural/non-natural distinction being made; instead, the doctrine of “useful 
difference” arose in the chemical sector, was duly applied by Learned Hand in 
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the Parke-Davis case, and proved to be a legal gateway for isolated biological 
compounds that could demonstrate sufficient practical usefulness to constitute 
patentable difference over the prior art. As a historical matter, the traditional 
understanding of the doctrine is backwards:314 rather than appearing as an 
“isolation and purification exception” to the ban on patenting products of 
nature, the isolation-and-purification patents came first, and the case law 
against patenting natural products arrived only later. 
Time will tell if the useful difference test becomes the framework for DNA 
patenting in the future. As I have suggested, the idea that great enough new 
utility can convey sufficient novelty on an isolated natural product is not a 
major feature of the two cases (Funk and Chakrabarty) allegedly guiding the 
Federal Circuit’s Myriad opinions. Reading those cases that way, as Judges 
Moore and Bryson arguably do, depends on imbuing them with the spirit of 
Judge Hand’s Parke-Davis ruling. This approach allows for a highly pragmatic 
rule of patentability, focused on rewarding valuable inventions if the 
circumstances warrant, and deployable (as Judge Moore’s opinion shows) to 
avoid the disruption and recrimination that would accompany mass invalidation 
of isolated DNA patents. Such pragmatism would be much in the tradition of 
Learned Hand. Whether it is the best course or not, the courts will have to 
decide. 
Finally, the history tells a story about how patent law and its wider context 
change each other. Formal legal doctrine aside, the events of the adrenalin 
battle left their mark on the medical and scientific world in which they arose. 
Patenting in the life sciences became an un-ignorable fact of life in the 
twentieth century, and—whatever the outcome of Myriad—will continue to be 
in the twenty-first. From where we stand now, it is striking to look back to the 
point when the American pharmaceutical industry and the medical profession 
turned away from patent-skepticism and embraced the propriety of patent 
rights. Standing at the threshold of these events, the Parke-Davis story reminds 
us that an intellectual property culture is not inevitable, but develops piece by 
piece. Learned Hand’s decision a century ago was another brick in the wall. 
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